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PROSECUTORS AND MASS
INCARCERATION
SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN* & MEGAN S. WRIGHT†
It has long been postulated that America’s mass incarceration
phenomenon is driven by increased drug arrests, draconian sentencing, and
the growth of the prison industry. Yet among the major players—legislators,
judges, police, and prosecutors—one of these is shrouded in mystery. While
laws on the books, judicial sentencing, and police arrests are all public and
transparent, prosecutorial charging decisions are made behind closed doors
with little oversight or public accountability. Indeed, without notice by
commentators, during the last ten years or more, crime has fallen, and police
have cut arrests accordingly, but prosecutors have actually increased the
ratio of criminal court filings per arrest. Why? This Article presents
quantitative and qualitative data from the first randomized controlled
experiment studying how prosecutors nationally decide whether to charge a
defendant. We find rampant variation and multiple charges for a single
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crime along with the lowest rates of declination in a national study.
Crosscutting this empirical analysis is an exploration of Supreme Court and
prosecutor standards that help guide prosecutorial decisions. This novel
approach makes important discoveries about prosecutorial charging that
are critical to understanding mass incarceration.
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INTRODUCTION
It is now rote to say that the United States incarcerates too many
people.1 The United States has been the world leader in incarceration for
1. Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 811, 816 (2017) (“[The United States] keep[s] more people behind bars than the top thirty-five
European countries combined, and our rate of incarceration dwarfs not only other Western allies but also
countries like Russia and Iran.”); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration
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decades2 and will likely be for years to come.3 Even though many are aware
of the problem, mass incarceration is not improving any time soon.4 The oftin African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2004) (“The sheer scale and
acceleration of U.S. prison growth has no parallel in western societies.”); Ian F. Haney López, PostRacial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1023, 1029 (2010) (presenting numerical data establishing the U.S. incarceration rates as “the highest in
the world, exceed[ing] the highest rate in Europe by 500 percent”); Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Modern Day
Scarlet Letter, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2999, 3000 (2015) (identifying mass incarceration, as “one of the
most significant social problems” in the United States); Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking
Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1803–04 (2012) (“[T]here has been
an increase in both the rate of imprisonment and the absolute number of people in prison. That increase
has been called ‘unprecedented in the history of liberal democracy.’ ”).
2. The U.S. incarceration rate quintupled from 1972 to its peak in 2007 (767 per 100,000). NAT’L
RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014). The 2017 incarceration
rate declined slightly to about 660 per 100,000, and the 2018 incarceration rate declined to about 650 per
100,000. LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2017–2018, at 4 tbl.4 (2020), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cpus1718.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4WN-JGE2]. Still, the United States maintains the
highest incarceration rate in the world. Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The
Global Context 2018, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE fig.1 (June 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/
2018.html [https://perma.cc/387R-QKTJ].
3. Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 627
(2006) (providing a brief articulation of the “exploding incarceration levels over the past two decades”
within the United States).
4. Haney López, supra note 1, at 1048 (“The invisibility of significant facets of continued
nonwhite poverty and unemployment leads to false comfort about . . . social reform.”); Marie Gottschalk,
Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 1695–97
(2006) (identifying several significant hurdles to carceral reform); Rachel E. Barkow, Three Lessons for
Criminal Law Reformers from Locking Up Our Own, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1967 (2019) (articulating
possible frameworks for criminal law reform that require sweeping cultural or systemic change subject
to inconsistent factors such as voter approval, political approval, and the cultural climate); Donald
Braman, Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and Reforming Criminal Sanctions in America,
53 UCLA L. REV. 1143, 1183–85 (2006) (noting the significant differences in approach and opinion
regarding reform); Sonja B. Starr, Evidenced-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 870 (2014) (discussing a “politically palatable way to cut back on
the United States’ sprawling system of mass incarceration”); Dylan Rodríguez, Abolition as Praxis of
Human Being: A Foreword, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2019) (“Contemporary reformist approaches
to addressing the apparent overreach and scandalous excesses of the carceral state—characterized by calls
to end ‘police brutality’ and ‘mass incarceration’—fail to recognize that the very logics of the overlapping
criminal justice and policing regimes systemically perpetuate racial, sexual, gender, colonial, and class
violence through carceral power.”); ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS
AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 41–44 (2018) (discussing the fourfold
increase in the number of arrests in New York City for misdemeanors during broken windows policing,
which did not increase convictions, but rather court congestion); HEATHER SCHOENFELD, BUILDING THE
PRISON STATE: RACE AND THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION 146–48, back cover (2018)
(discussing the “embrace of incarceration” that was politically incentivized).
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repeated story is that the war on drugs,5 legislative sentencing practices,6 or
the growth of prisons has caused mass incarceration.7 These are all
contributing causes. However, in the last ten or more years, the number of
crimes committed have decreased,8 the number of arrests per year have
decreased consistently,9 and while people are still serving long sentences,10
some federal sentences have been reduced.11
5. MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEAR QUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON
DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 2 (2007) (identifying the carceral impact of the war on
drugs); Rodríguez, supra note 4, at 1593 (attributing the “2.3 million people held captive by the state” as
an unintended consequence of the war on drugs); JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 37, 39, 143 (2017) (discussing draconian drug sentences that
disproportionately impacted minority defendants); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLOR BLINDNESS 60 (2d ed. 2012) (arguing that the war on drugs,
fueled by racism, drove mass incarceration); MONA LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS: THE COERCIVE POWER OF
DRUG LAWS IN FEDERAL COURT 23–29 (2016) (demonstrating how the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
gave increased power to prosecutors to plea bargain in the federal context, increasing sentence lengths
and the numbers of individuals prosecuted).
6. MAUER & KING, supra note 5, at 7–8 (describing how harsh sentencing laws from the 1980s
affected the federal sentencing guidelines, resulting in more people incarcerated for longer periods of
time); KARA GOTSCH & VINAY BASTI, SENTENCING PROJECT, CAPITALIZING ON MASS INCARCERATION:
U.S. GROWTH IN PRIVATE PRISONS 5 (2018) (“The War on Drugs and harsher sentencing policies,
including mandatory minimum sentences, fueled a rapid expansion in the nation’s prison population
beginning in the 1980s.”); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL REFORM IN AMERICA,
1975–2025, at vii (2016) (“No one admires American sentencing systems. They are arbitrary and unjust,
they are much too severe, they ruin countless lives, and they have produced a shameful system of mass
incarceration.”). Also, those convicted of felonies in the United States are far more likely to be sentenced
to prison and are sentenced to longer terms than similarly situated defendants in other countries. See id.
at 12.
7. SCHOENFELD, supra note 4, at 22 (“[P]rison capacity fueled the politics of crime, not vice
versa.”); GOTSCH & VINAY, supra note 6, at 5–9 (illustrating the trend toward privatization of prisons in
the United States through data); Adam Gopnik, How We Misunderstand Mass Incarceration, NEW
YORKER (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/10/how-we-misunderstandmass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/8N3B-R7PJ] (“The [prevailing theory of mass incarceration] insists
that, first, the root cause of incarceration is the racist persecution of young black men for drug crimes,
which overpopulates the prisons with nonviolent offenders. Then mandatory-sentencing laws leave
offenders serving long prison sentences for relatively minor crimes. This hugely expanded prison
population, one that tracks in reverse the decline of actual crime, has led to a commerce in caged men—
private-prison contractors, and a specialized lobby in favor of prison construction, which in turn demands
men to feed into the system.”). See generally KEVIN MUHITCH & NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, SENTENCING
PROJECT, PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2021) (providing a brief overview of the
privatization of prisons in the United States).
8. Shima Baradaran Baughman, How Effective Are Police? The Problem of Clearance Rates and
Criminal Accountability, 72 ALA. L. REV. 47 (2020) (providing data demonstrating that crime has gone
down in the United States over the last thirty years).
9. The number of arrests nationally has decreased since 2006. Baughman, supra note 8, at 85–86
(comparing U.S. arrest rates and noting the 1998 rate reached 25.72%, decreased in 2004 to 21.98%, and
has not yet risen back to the 1998 level).
10. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 2, at 54–55 (finding that longer
sentences increased prison admissions in the 1980s to 2010); RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF
POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERATION 17–18 (2019) (discussing the problem of
long sentences, lack of support for rehabilitation, and harsh collateral consequences); see infra note 86.
11. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220 (“Reduc[ing] and
restrict[ing] enhanced sentencing for prior drug felonies.”); John F. Pfaff, The Myths and Realities of
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An alternative explanation for the persistence of mass incarceration is
prosecutor felony filing decisions since the 1980s.12 This explanation relies
on an increase in the number of felony filings by prosecutors.13 Misdemeanor
filings have gone largely unnoticed from explanations of mass
incarceration,14 and no one has analyzed data to see what impact these filings
have had on mass incarceration. According to our analysis of national data,
since 2003, prosecutor charging per arrest has gone up every year.15 In the
face of both falling crime and public pressure to stop mass incarceration,
prosecutors are not responding as readily as police, a point almost completely
unnoticed by commentators.16
Throughout criminal justice—and maybe even across the law
generally—the prosecutor may be the government official with the most
Correctional Severity: Evidence from the National Corrections Reporting Program on Sentencing
Practices, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 491, 493–94 (2011)(articulating the largely accepted view that
prisoners are serving longer sentences while providing data demonstrating that “[i]n many states, the
median time served has declined over much of the 1990s”).
12. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 72 (2017) [hereinafter PFAFF, LOCKED IN] (using a thirty-four-state sample to
show that in 1994 about one of every three arrests turned into a felony case, and by the end of the 2000s,
it was two out of every three arrests); John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic
Account of Prison Growth, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1106 (2013) (“At least since 1994, it appears that
almost all the growth in prison populations has come from prosecutors’ decisions to file felony charges.”);
John F. Pfaff, The Causes of Growth in Prison Admissions and Population 1 (Jan. 23, 2012) [hereinafter
Pfaff, Growth in Prison Admissions] (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=
1990508 [https://perma.cc/7UEX-EZMU]) (“[T]he growth in prison populations has been driven almost
entirely by increases in felony filings per arrest.”); see also EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW
MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION, at xxv (2019)
(discussing prosecutors’ contributions to mass incarceration since the 1980s due to their “unfettered
power” and claiming they are “not the only ones at fault” but “their decisions are the ones that matter
most of all”).
13. PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12, at 71–72 (following data starting in the 1990s through 2007
demonstrating that increases in prosecutor charges filed track the growth in prison admissions);
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (2015) (comparing
the 2.3 million felony cases filed every year in the United States to the 10 million misdemeanor cases
filed every year); KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 4, at 42 (showing New York police made 251,000
misdemeanor arrests in 2010, a roughly fourfold increase from the 65,000 misdemeanor arrests in 1980).
14. By the 2010s, roughly half of all misdemeanor cases resulted in dismissal. Kohler-Hausmann
points out that by that time there were more arrests and higher racial concentration, but lower conviction
rates and jail sentences. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 4, at 51, 60, 67. Kohler-Hausmann argues that
lower courts then decide to “manage” individuals, rather than decide whether they committed the crime.
Id. at 73; see also ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE
MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 2–3 (2018)
(arguing people are punished for misdemeanors long before they are convicted).
15. See infra Section I.B.
16. One regional news article commented on the trend of reduced crime but increased felony filings
in Colorado, blaming drug addiction rather than a broader problem with prosecutors. See Allison Sherry,
Prosecutors File a Record Number of Felonies Even as Colorado’s Crime Remains Flat, CPR NEWS
(Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.cpr.org/2019/02/04/prosecutors-file-a-record-number-of-felonies-even-ascolorados-crime-remains-flat [https://perma.cc/V7M9-9D2Z].
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unreviewable discretion.17 In 2017, the U.S. criminal legal system processed
around five million felony and twelve million misdemeanor cases each
year.18 These cases are all in the hands of one criminal justice actor: a
prosecutor. None of these arrests become cases unless a prosecutor decides
to charge. Prosecutors decide whether to initiate criminal proceedings, what
charges to bring, what penalties to seek, and when a plea bargain is
appropriate.19 And since 94% of criminal convictions are resolved by plea
bargain, prosecutors—not judges—determine a defendant’s fate the vast
majority of the time.20
Prosecutors can decide not to bring any charges at all21 or drop any or
all of the charges at any time.22 For instance, with misdemeanor cases,
17. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 959, 959 (2009) (“No government official has as much unreviewable power or discretion as the
prosecutor.”); Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2020) (noting that
“[s]cholars view prosecutors as ‘the most powerful officials in the criminal justice system,’ and blame
them for ‘[m]uch of what is wrong with American criminal justice’ ”); ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY
JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 (2007) (noting that prosecutors’ “routine,
everyday decisions . . . have greater impact and more serious consequences than those of any other
criminal justice official” despite “that they are totally discretionary and virtually unreviewable”); Adam
M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal Justice: Should Prosecutors Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 677, 677–78 (2016) (“No serious observer disputes that prosecutors drive sentencing and
hold most of the power in the United States criminal justice system.”); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial
Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669, 672 (explaining that “[i]n exercising the
charging function, the prosecutor enjoys broad, indeed virtually unlimited, discretion”); Logan Sawyer,
Reform Prosecutors and Separation of Powers, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 603, 613 (2020) (noting that “there is
very little formal oversight of the decisions prosecutors make outside of the courtroom—where their most
important decisions are made”); Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125,
1127 (2005) (noting prosecutors have “near total control over the decision of when and what to charge in
a potential criminal case”).
18. In total, there were 17.4 million criminal cases filed in 2017. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
STATE COURT CASELOAD DIGEST: 2017 DATA 2 (2017) [hereinafter CASELOAD DIGEST 2017]. In 2017,
based on data from twenty-six states, there were 3.5 misdemeanor cases to every 1 felony case, or about
71.5% were misdemeanors and 28.5% of cases were felonies. Id at 9. Therefore, that year, there were
likely about 5 million felonies and about 12.4 million misdemeanors filed. Cf. Natapoff, supra note 13,
at 1063 (estimating that misdemeanors comprise approximately 80% of most state dockets); KOHLERHAUSMANN, supra note 4, at 2 n.5 (estimating 9.5 million misdemeanor cases filed each year in the thirtyfive sampled states); NATAPOFF, supra note 14, at 251 (estimating the “total size of the 2015 US
misdemeanor docket [at] 13,240,034 criminal filings”).
19. See infra notes 93–103.
20. See SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS,
2006 – STATISTICAL TABLES 25 tbl.4.1 (rev. 2010).
21. See STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROSECUTORS IN STATE
COURTS, 2007 – STATISTICAL TABLES 8 tbl.10, 9 fig.3 (2011) (relying on the 2007 Census of State Court
Prosecutors, 47% of all state prosecutor offices publicly reported a declination to prosecute).
22. Samuel J. Levine, The Potential Utility of Disciplinary Regulation as a Remedy for Abuses of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2016) (“[T]hrough the decision
whether or not to file charges, the prosecutor determines if a particular individual will face the machinery
of the criminal justice system, while other discretionary decisions, such as those relating to what charges
to file and the terms of a plea bargain, have a substantial—and often determinative—effect on the outcome
of a case.”); Geoffrey S. Corn & Adam M. Gershowitz, Imputed Liability for Supervising Prosecutors:
Applying the Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14
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prosecutors decide to drop charges up to 80% of the time.23 However, once
a prosecutor charges a crime, the damage to a defendant is often done—even
if charges are later dropped.24 A defendant with criminal charges often is
detained pretrial and then has a criminal record, which may cause collateral
consequences for life.25 Understanding how prosecutors make charging
decisions is essential in determining the impact of charging on defendants as
well as the underlying causes of mass incarceration.
Hundreds of articles in recent years have been written about
prosecutors.26 Some have recently envisioned a more progressive prosecutor
who refuses to charge cases and is focused on criminal justice reform.27
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 395, 399 (2009) (“Prosecutors can charge bargain, add, or subtract offenses in
order to reach the prison sentence they desire.”).
23. Shima Baradaran Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U. L. REV. 837, 872
(2018) (noting that misdemeanor violations are dismissed 80% of the time and ultimately result in no
legal consequences).
24. Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987, 997–1000 (2019) (discussing the ways
in which people who are arrested are treated as guilty); Natapoff, supra note 13, at 1091 (“Police are more
likely to arrest an individual who has been arrested or charged before.”).
25. The impacts of mass incarceration are not just prison numbers and families split apart, but also
increased numbers of people who cannot be productive members of society because they have a charge
on their record. Even those who are not incarcerated (or leave jail after a short stint) are permanently
excluded from much of public life because of their “record.” See SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE
BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 77–92 (2017);
Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and
Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 459 (2010) (demonstrating the “wide range of collateral consequences
stemming from [criminal] convictions”); Natapoff, supra note 13, at 1091 n.168 (noting over 45,000
collateral consequences of criminal conviction and infractions).
26. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 17; infra notes 27–30; Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi,
Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker,
123 YALE L.J. 2, 6 (2013) (“The modern criminal justice process is prosecutor-dominated. Prosecutors
have broad charging and plea-bargaining discretion, and their choices have a huge impact on sentences.”);
Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1415 (2021) (describing
different types of progressive prosecutors and their various areas of focus); Bellin, supra note 17, at 1212–
15 (articulating an alternative “servant-of-the-law” theory to govern prosecutors); see also Bruce A.
Green, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public Inquiry, 123 DICK. L. REV. 589,
606 (2019) [hereinafter Green, Prosecutorial Discretion] (“[T]here is no established vocabulary for
judging prosecutors’ exercise of discretion . . . .”); George C. Thomas, III, Discretion and Criminal Law:
The Good, the Bad, and the Mundane, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043, 1058 (2005) (arguing that discretion
is inevitable but that some kinds are more acceptable than others); Bennett L. Gershman, The Zealous
Prosecutor as Minister of Justice, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 151 (2011); Bruce A. Green, Why Should
Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999) [hereinafter Green, Seek Justice];
Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the PostConviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2009); Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as
Minister of Justice and Administrator of Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301 (1996); Bruce A. Green
& Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial
Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143 (2016).
27. W. Kerrel Murray, Populist Prosecutorial Nullification, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 173, 176–77
(2021) (discussing prosecutors who refuse to charge cases in effect “nullifying” the law); Levin, supra
note 26; Bellin, supra note 17, at 1206 (providing examples of prosecutors across the nation whose acts
depict them as “representatives of a national movement to leverage prosecutorial power to achieve
criminal justice reform”); Levine, supra note 17, at 1127–29 (recasting the prosecutor as head “problem-
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There are many conflicting theoretical frameworks to understand
prosecutors.28 What has been lacking is empirical data to narrow the field of
theories. The existing empirical data is localized, often dated, and not
nationally representative.29 Even worse, the archival data does not include
the key variables of interest, which would be the granular facts of the cases,
as presented to prosecutors. Accordingly, we cannot understand what might
be happening with prosecutor charging—otherwise known as the “black
box” of criminal justice.30
Despite the importance of understanding prosecutorial decisions, we
have the answers to so few of the basic questions about how prosecutors
make decisions. For instance, how many charges on average does a
prosecutor charge for a single incident?31 How often do prosecutors decline
to charge when they have evidence to do so?32 When do they impose a fine
solver,” a role that involves counseling of defendants, not just acting as an advocate, and working on
crime reduction and other nontraditional tasks to improve criminal justice); Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent
Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 307 (2001) (concluding that “[p]rosecutorial discretion
requires public moral judgement” over theories of legal or personal moral judgment); M. Elaine NugentBorakove, Performance Measures and Accountability, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 91, 93–94 (2008) (outlining some prosecutorial theories as well as five types of prosecutors
and their respective goals or objectives); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, When Prosecutors Politick:
Progressive Law Enforcers Then and Now, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 719, 722 (2020) (comparing
“the new progressive prosecutors to the Progressive Era criminal justice reformers to identify the benefits
and concerns that accompany a prosecutorial reform movement linked to popular politics”).
28. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1891–93 (2000)
(arguing that the reason for the difference between the public and prosecutorial interest is that individual
prosecutors do not reflect on the impact of their decisions); R. Michael Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice:
A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Support Sentencing Reform, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 981, 981 (2014) (“While
other authors have explored the tensions between a prosecutor’s adversarial duties and ‘minister of
justice’ role . . . , few have explored what it means to be an ‘administer’ of justice in the wider political
arena.”); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The “Smart on Crime” Prosecutor, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 905, 906
(2012) (highlighting the “smart on crime” movement for prosecutors, which emphasizes fairness and
accuracy, reducing recidivism, crime prevention, transition out of prison, and cost efficiency); K. Babe
Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice
System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 287 (2014) (calling on “prosecutors to exercise their discretion to
decline to prosecute minor offenses where arrest patterns show a disparate impact on racial minorities”).
29. See infra notes 135, 137. But see Eric Rasmusen, Manu Raghav & Mark Ramseyer,
Convictions Versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice, 11 AM. L & ECON. REV. 47, 70–75
(2009) (studying the effects of prosecutors’ case selection and conviction rates using SCPS 1990–2002
felony defendants and testing two models of prosecutorial behavior, one that balances the social planning
goal against personal objectives and a goal of high conviction rate). The study found that conviction rates
rise with budgets and are higher where prosecutors are elected rather than appointed. Id. However, it also
revealed that overall prosecution rates do not have a clear correlation with budget increases and that
conviction rates are slightly lower in high-crime districts where the prosecution rate is higher. Id.
30. See generally Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125 (2008)
(discussing the reasons for declinations by prosecutors in New Orleans, Charlotte, and San Diego).
31. These questions can be answered with data, but this data is often neither collected nor released.
32. We have national estimates on declination, but we do not have information on whether
prosecutors declined to charge because they lacked appropriate evidence or because they felt that the
crime did not warrant a charge. We also lack details on cases that prosecutors declined to charge, which
could provide insight into their thinking on declination. See infra notes 198–207.
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or incarcerate an individual? Under what circumstances does a prosecutor
charge a felony or misdemeanor? These are all basic charging questions
every prosecutor answers every day. Without an understanding of how
prosecutors make decisions, it is difficult to create a cogent theory to
understand prosecutors or mass incarceration.
The reason we know so little is because prosecutors are nearly
impossible to study. They do not release information on how they make
charging decisions, and often they do not even internally analyze these
critical decisions. A review of empirical data on prosecutors demonstrates
this problem.33 Existing prosecutor studies do not provide answers to the
basic charging questions that we most want to know about.34
This Article studies prosecutorial charging decisions both empirically
and theoretically, focusing on the role admissions—rather than time
served—plays in the prolonged existence of mass incarceration. The
empirical backbone of this Article—our study about prosecutor
decisionmaking using a national sample of state prosecutors—questions the
conventional wisdom of the root causes and persistence of mass
incarceration.35 Of particular interest is prosecutors’ discretion in the initial
charging decision, since this discretion may reduce the efficacy of upstream
reforms such as reduced arrests or downstream policy changes like
sentencing reform.36 This Article explores how prosecutors use discretion in
33. See infra Section I.B.
34. See infra notes 134–38 for previous prosecutorial studies.
35. Christopher Robertson, Shima Baradaran Baughman & Megan S. Wright, Race and Class: A
Randomized Experiment with Prosecutors, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 807, 807–847 (2019). We
completed data collection in 2017 and finished coding data in 2018.
36. Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 1599, 1602 (2012) (“[Sentencing] commissions could and should do more to address the
relationship between guidelines and prosecutorial power. . . . Because some amount of prosecutorial
discretion is necessary and inevitable, guidelines must account for that reality.”); Kate Stith & Karen
Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch,
58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 221 (2005) (“[O]ver the past two decades, sentencing authority has been
transferred from judges through a politically weak Commission to Congress and, in the end, to
prosecutors.”); Russell D. Covey, Rules, Standards, Sentencing, and the Nature of Law, 104 CALIF L.
REV. 447, 483 (2016) (“When they are aware that mandatory-minimum sentencing provisions might
require imposing onerous sentences even when mitigating facts exist, prosecutors might file less serious
charges or drop prosecutions altogether to avoid what they consider to be unjustifiable results.”). In
addition to trying to address mass incarceration, it is also important to test upstream policy remedies, such
as blinding prosecutors to defendant race and class information, which may reduce biases in or increase
perceived legitimacy of prosecutor decisions. Sunita Sah, Christopher T. Robertson & Shima B.
Baughman, Blinding Prosecutors to Defendants’ Race: A Policy Proposal to Reduce Unconscious Bias
in the Criminal Justice System, BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y, Dec. 2015, at 69, 71 (arguing that one way to
“manage bias is to acknowledge its existence and create institutional procedures to prevent bias from
influencing important decisions”); Robertson et al., supra note 35, at 808 (examining how prosecutors
use their “very broad discretion in the initial charging decision, since this discretion may reduce the
efficacy of downstream policy reforms such as sentencing guidelines, which have been enacted to reduce
disparities in outcomes”).
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the initial charging decision, whether they decide to punish an individual,
and how much they decide to punish. This analysis suggests three important
conclusions that challenge our understanding of prosecutors. First,
prosecutors in our study charged defendants 97% of the time—contradicting
existing estimates that prosecutors decline up to 50% of cases, a difference
which may be due to prosecutors in the experiment charging what they wish
they could charge, without the burden of a real world caseload.37 Second,
prosecutors in our study recommended much harsher punishments than we
anticipated based on previous studies—even though most prosecutors did not
impose jail time, they charged an average of three crimes for a single incident
and almost half of the recommended fines.38 Third, we found great disparity
in prosecutorial decisions for the same hypothetical crime, which has
important implications for defendant equity and proportionality in
punishment. We compare all of these novel results with guidance from the
Supreme Court and prosecution standards. This statutory and case law
analysis considers whether prosecutors are acting in accord with Court
precedent and statutory dictates in their charging decisions. It also considers
the role of prosecutorial discretion and transparency in our understanding of
how prosecutors contribute to mass incarceration.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an in-depth
background on prosecutor discretion and its impact on criminal justice. It
also delves into the empirical debate on the prosecutorial role in the
persistence of mass incarceration and addresses limitations of previous
prosecutorial research. Part II describes results from our study of prosecutor
decisionmaking in which real prosecutors were asked to review realistic but
hypothetical cases and make charging decisions. Part III discusses more fully
the decisions of prosecutors in light of the latest instructions from the
Supreme Court and national prosecution guidelines. The Conclusion
provides some thoughts on balancing prosecutor discretion and transparency.
37. There is significant variation in estimates of the percent of cases in which prosecutors decline
to bring charges. However, a recent estimate from Miller et al. demonstrated a 52% declination rate over
a ten-year period in New Orleans. Wright & Miller, infra note 30, at 74.
As previously noted, the charging decisions in this experiment likely reflect what the
prosecutors wish they could charge initially, rather than what they could actually end up charging. The
large gap between experimental outcomes and current estimates is likely due to the absence of real-life
constraints, such as the pressure of a large caseload and limited office resources, and the fact that the
experiment was what prosecutors would charge initially, rather than what has been observed in other
studies as actually being charged.
38. The question of the “appropriate” level of prosecutor severity is something we will discuss
very briefly in this Article, see infra notes 213–15, and more fully in a forthcoming work. See Megan
Wright, Shima Baradaran Baughman & Christopher Robertson, Inside the Black Box of Prosecutor
Discretion, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
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I. UNDERSTANDING PROSECUTOR DECISIONS
For many years, the leading theory has been that the war on drugs and
changes in sentencing are responsible for mass incarceration.39 Later,
scholars noticed the growth of prisons—both public and private and the
accompanying new motivations to fill prisons—as another contributing
cause to mass incarceration.40 In recent years, John Pfaff and Emily Bazelon
have both argued that prosecutors are primarily to blame for mass
incarceration.41 Relying on felony data from 1990 to 2007, Pfaff asserts that
prosecutors have caused the epic mass incarceration problem by filing more
felonies per prosecutor each year. This theory has been challenged
prominently by two scholars.
In this Part, we will briefly summarize Pfaff’s theory and his critics, as
well as provide data beyond the years provided by Pfaff, examining what has
happened with prosecutors in the last ten years. We analyze both felony and
misdemeanor data and demonstrate that prosecutors have actually reduced
the rates of crimes charged from 2003 until 2018. So instead of annual
increases in criminal charges by prosecutors, we have seen annual decreases.
However, despite the decrease in crime rates over those same years and the
25% decrease in arrest rates, prosecutors have not decreased charging
commensurately with arrest rates during this same period. Indeed,
prosecutors have increased their ratio of criminal court filings per arrest. In
essence, prosecutors present a formidable obstacle to cutting mass
incarceration—not only with felony filings, but also with misdemeanor
filings. Section I.A discusses the significant discretion prosecutors possess.
Section I.B delves into the prosecution data supporting mass incarceration;
and Section I.C discusses previous empirical work on prosecutors.
A. PROSECUTOR DISCRETION
Understanding who prosecutors are and how they make decisions is
important to determining their role in mass incarceration. Prosecutors are
government attorneys who represent the State in criminal cases and decide
whether to charge after an arrest.42 A prosecutor investigates and prosecutes
39. See PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12, and BAZELON, supra note 12, for books addressing this
issue.
40. See PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12.
41. Id.; BAZELON, supra note 12.
42. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017) (“The prosecutor is an administrator of justice, a zealous advocate, and an office of the court.”);
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“So long as the prosecutor has probable cause . . . ,
the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally
rests entirely in his discretion.”).
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criminal cases and provides advice regarding criminal matters.43
In their role as an advocate for the state, prosecutors have substantial
discretion.44 What does this mean? Prosecutors decide whether to initiate
criminal proceedings,45 what crimes to charge,46 or decline,47 how and when
to prosecute the charges,48 what penalties to seek,49 when to offer plea
43. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.1 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017).
44. Wesley MacNeil Oliver & Rishi Batra, Standards of Legitimacy in Criminal Negotiations, 20
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 67 (2015) (“Prosecutors possess extraordinary power to charge defendants.”);
Thomas, supra note 26, at 1043 (“Discretion in enforcement and prosecution of crime is inevitable . . . .”);
Brandon K. Crase, Note, When Doing Justice Isn’t Enough: Reinventing the Guidelines for Prosecutorial
Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 475 (2007) (“[T]he discretion afforded prosecutors exists at
every level of the criminal justice system, whether the defendant is Martha Stewart or the guy next door,
and the impact on the defendant is substantially the same.”).
45. Sarah Ribstein, Note, A Question of Costs: Considering Pressure on White-Collar Criminal
Defendants, 58 DUKE L.J. 857, 868 (2009) (“Prosecutors in street-crime cases have a great deal of
discretion as to whether or not to indict . . . .”); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 773 (1996) (“[C]urrent prosecutorial discretion is virtually
unlimited . . . .”); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV.
29, 49–50 (2002) (“Through deliberate choices about screening, a chief prosecutor can change the place
of jury trials, the pattern of convictions and dismissals, the allocation of police and correctional resources,
and the public’s access to information about the system.”).
46. NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-2.1 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009) (“It is the
ultimate responsibility of the prosecutor’s office to determine which criminal charges should be
prosecuted and against whom.”); Nicole T. Amsler, Note, Leveling the Playing Field: Applying Federal
Corporate Charging Considerations to Individuals, 66 DUKE L.J. 169, 176 (2016) (“[T]he number of
violations a federal prosecutor can choose from when charging someone with a crime is so enormous that
it is essentially countless.”); Craig H. Solomon, Note, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness: Divergent Lower
Court Applications of the Due Process Prohibition, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 324 (1982)
(“Prosecutors enjoy considerable discretion in deciding what charges, if any, to bring against a suspect.”).
47. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1700 (2010) (“[P]rosecutors have significant authority to decline charges for
equitable reasons . . . , but their professional position leaves them overcautious. They have power, but
they may lack will and perspective.”); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An
Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 605 (2005)
(describing how crimes with consistent legal definitions cause prosecutors to enforce the crimes “as
written” resulting in more systematic and aggressive enforcement).
48. See Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect
Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV. 489, 490 (2017) (“Prosecutorial discretion refers to the power . . . to determine
how, when, and whether to initiate and pursue enforcement proceedings.”); Cynthia Alkon, The U.S.
Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 561, 598 (2014) (“[P]rosecutors can decide, almost without limit, to add additional charges or
enhancements after the case has been filed, as long as the additions are at least arguably supported by the
evidence.”).
49. Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 84 (2011)
(“Prosecutors exercise sovereign authority when they determine who may be punished for legal
transgressions and who will not.”); Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1071, 1090 (2017) (“[P]rosecutors have the latitude to charge a wide range of crimes and
to seek a wide range of penalties as long as the prosecutor believes the charges and sought-after penalties
are ‘consistent with the nature of the defendant’s conduct’ or the likelihood of success at trial is high,
without regard to the incarceration effect of the charges.”).
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bargains,50 and what sentencing recommendations to advise.51 Prosecutors
can “freely choose” between charging options, and defendants are generally
stuck with these choices.52 Prosecutors’ discretionary power is not unlimited,
as the scope of the power depends on statutes passed by legislatures.53
However, in most states criminal statutes are numerous, and there are often
more than enough options for criminal charging in every area.54
The prosecutor may have more discretion than any government
official.55 Most profoundly, when deciding whether to charge a case, the
50. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117
YALE L.J. 1420, 1454 (2008) (“Since prosecutorial discretion and plea bargains control most outcomes,
the system as it actually operates relies on both the priorities and the judgments of prosecutors. The default
is the plea bargain (or sentence bargain), with the adversarial jury trial serving as a kind of judicial review
for defendants who are not content with administrative adjudication by the prosecutor.”); Jeffrey Standen,
Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (1993) (“As the sole
‘purchasers’ of criminal defendants’ convictions and incriminating information, prosecutors . . . possess
substantial power to overwhelm criminal defendants in the plea bargaining process.”); Alkon, supra note
48, at 599 (“Prosecutors also have the power to decide not to make a plea offer. In effect, the prosecutors
hold all the cards; defendants only have the power to throw a monkey wrench into the system by
demanding a jury trial.”); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV.
407, 449 (2008) (“Prosecutors can reassure defendants of their neutrality and trustworthiness by
employing objective criteria in making plea bargaining decisions, explaining their decisions, and
demonstrating consideration of defense arguments in favor of lenience . . . .”); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee,
Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 105, 107 (1994) (“The prosecutor may engage in plea negotiations with the defendant and may
threaten increased charges should a defendant fail to accept the prosecutor’s plea offer.”).
51. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1521
(1981) (“The decisions [prosecutors] make determine in large part who will be convicted and what
punishment will be imposed.”); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of
Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1012 (2005) (“Prosecutors have become more
powerful through the potent combination of far-reaching and duplicative criminal codes, relatively few
resources available for trial, and nondiscretionary sentencing laws. While judges now find themselves
increasingly accountable to the law of sentencing, prosecutors have accumulated new powers and
encounter no new regulation of their authority.”).
52. Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 178 (2019); Michael Tonry,
Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Perspective, 41 CRIME & JUST. 1, 5 (2012) (“Discretionary
prosecutorial decisions are for all practical purposes immune from judicial review.”). Bruce A. Green and
Fred C. Zacharias argue that prosecutors should make decisions based on articulable principles or
subprinciples that command broad societal acceptance. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias,
Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 840. “[S]pecific rules or criteria constraining
prosecutorial decisionmaking cannot be formulated without first identifying fundamental governing
norms. Although these norms need not be universally accepted, they ought to have some claim to public
support.” Id. at 904. This proposal could prove challenging to implement because prosecutors have never
attempted to identify workable norms for the array of discretionary decisions that prosecutors’ offices
make every day.
53. Bellin, supra note 52, at 184 (noting that “all prosecutors’ . . . powers depend on an
enforceable statute enacted by the legislature”).
54. See Baughman, supra note 49 (discussing overcriminalization and the increasingly large
number of criminal statutes from which prosecutors may choose to charge an individual); see also Wright,
supra note 51.
55. Bibas, supra note 17. However, prosecutors’ ability to bring and dismiss charges can be limited
by other officials. For example, in Virginia, police can bring charges in misdemeanor cases and a
prosecutor often will not see the case until after arraignment, meaning a judge would have to sign off on
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prosecutor brings the ultimate weight of the state down on the defendant.56
The constitutional checks that could exist on prosecutors do not typically
exist.57 Judges and the public could pose a check on prosecutors, but this is
often not the case.58 Judges are usually unable to intervene on behalf of
criminal defendants when it comes to severe or disparate charging.59 About
94% of criminal convictions are resolved through plea bargaining, which
often takes place in private meetings.60 Accordingly, elections are not the
check that the Constitution envisioned for prosecutors.61
decisions to dismiss the case. Ryan J. Reilly, Cops Who Charged Civil Rights Leaders with Felonies Try
to Sideline Progressive Prosecutor, HUFFPOST (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/portsmouth-police-confederate-stephanie-morales_n_5f3bf494c5b6b1015127f1bd [https://perma.
cc/K96C-E6HH].
56. Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny,
86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408 (2001) (noting the many facets of a prosecutor’s power to charge an individual,
“arguably the most important prosecutorial power”). The United States has never ascribed to “mandatory
prosecution,” which theoretically allows prosecutors the ability to decline to charge. Albert W. Alschuler,
A Teetering Palladium?, 79 JUDICATURE 200, 201 (1996) (book review) (“[T]he discretion of
prosecutors . . . not to enforce the law is not only tolerated but applauded . . . .”); Vorenberg, supra note
51, at 1551 (“[S]ome nonenforcement of the law will occur . . . .”).
57. Baughman, supra note 49, at 1071 (arguing that the lack of constitutional checks on
prosecutors has had negative impacts on criminal law, including increased filings and excessive plea
bargaining, among others). There are some minimal constitutional limits. For example, prosecutors
cannot engage in selective or vindictive prosecution. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608
(1985); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28–29 (1974).
58. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View,
54 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 199 (2006) (arguing that judges are merely “passive verifiers” and have a minimal
role in the plea bargain process); Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1225 (2016) (discussing the diminished role of judges in plea bargaining). But see
Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 835, 849 (2018) (reviewing JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS
INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017)) (asserting that judges act as a check on
prosecutors because they have the final say on sentencing decisions).
59. Lee, supra note 50, at 164 (“[C]ourts are reluctant to intervene when their own notions of what
constitutes a proper charging decision conflict with the prosecutor’s charging decision because they
believe the nature of the decision is one that the prosecutor is equipped to make competently and
independently.”); Standen, supra note 50, at 1510 (“In the world of the sentencing guidelines, the judge
has little power to check prosecutorial charging decisions.”).
60. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 912, 923 (2006). Jeffrey Bellin argues that judges can act as a check on prosecutorial decisions,
claiming that “[a]ll prosecutors can do by themselves is let people off—a tactic that does not lend itself
to filling prisons.” Bellin, supra note 58, at 857. However, this is far from the reality. Prosecutors can
charge as many crimes as they want and plea bargain virtually without any checks. There are laws that
prevent prosecutorial accountability, and, while lawyers and judges should report misconduct, this rarely
occurs. Jennifer Lee, Note, ‘Justice for All’: The Necessity of New Prosecutorial Accountability
Measures, 90 MISS. L.J. 497, 504–05, 517 (2021) (“[D]efense attorney[s] . . . are frequently reluctant to
file a complaint [against prosecutors] due to fear of hindering professional working relationships . . . .
Judges also experience hesitancy to report prosecutorial misconduct in the courtroom because they do not
want voters in future elections to view them ‘soft on crime.’ . . . Finally, there is no way to compel
reporting, and no external body holds judges and practitioners accountable for turning a blind eye to
unethical behavior.”). Judges often rubberstamp a prosecutor’s charging decision and plea bargain.
61. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & Michael Morse, Picking Prosecutors, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1537
(2020) (considering whether elections are a check on prosecutors by analyzing data collected from the
most recent election cycles for all states that elect their prosecutors).
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This wide discretion creates opportunity for prosecutorial abuse,
including racial and gender bias,62 overcharging,63 vindictiveness,64
plea-bargaining abuses,65 and wrongful convictions.66 On the other side,
prosecutorial discretion allows prosecutors to adapt to different scenarios
involving unique facts and defendants and provides a way for prosecutors to
manage their expansive caseloads through plea bargaining,67 which some
argue is necessary for the administration of justice.68 Arguably, prosecutorial
discretion puts decisionmaking in the hands of those with in-depth
62. See State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 556 (Wash. 2011) (“Prosecutor Konat injected racial
prejudice into the trial proceedings by asserting that black witnesses are unreliable . . . .”); see also United
States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 774 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[C]ourts must not tolerate prosecutors’ efforts
gratuitously to inject issues like race and ethnicity into criminal trials.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging
Jena’s D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 420 (2009) (arguing
that “racially-skewed outcomes . . . cannot occur without prosecutorial support”); MO. TASK FORCE ON
GENDER & JUST., REPORT OF THE MISSOURI TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE (1993), reprinted in
58 MO. L. REV. 485, 506 (1993) (explaining that prosecutors may assign low priority to domestic violence
cases because they lack understanding, sensitivity, and may not believe female victims). But see
Robertson et al., supra note 35, at 844 (showing “insignificant findings of race or class bias” among
prosecutors).
63. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 104
(1968) (arguing the rise of plea bargaining incentivizes prosecutors to overcharge); see also Wright &
Miller, supra note 30, at 29, 32 (arguing for a hard screening system to prevent prosecutorial
overcharging); H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the
Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 72 (2011) (arguing that game theory sheds light on prosecutors’
incentives and motivations in overcharging defendants).
64. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368
(1982).
65. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 506, 510–11 (1984) (holding withdrawal of plea offer
after acceptance but before execution of plea not violative of due process); North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 40 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority opinion as holding that the threat
of death penalty to force a defendant to plead guilty to a lesser murder charge is not coercive); United
States v. Kennard, 46 F. App’x 426, 428 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (noting a prosecutor’s promise to
treat a third party leniently during plea bargaining is not coercive per se); United States v. Speed Joyeros,
204 F. Supp. 2d 412, 444 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing extended pretrial incarceration caused defendant’s
physical and mental health to deteriorate, but the plea bargain was acceptable despite the danger of due
process violations by the intensive pressure on defendant to plead guilty).
66. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 291 (discussing how wrongful conviction cases “challenge[] the
traditional assumption that the criminal justice system does all it can to accurately determine guilt”). See
generally Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions:
Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 403 (noting that an “initial study of the
first sixty-two persons exonerated by DNA evidence found some degree of prosecutorial misconduct in
twenty-six cases”).
67. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (2000) (arguing that
“crushing workloads” explain why prosecutors began to choose plea bargaining and why they continue
to do so today).
68. See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss,
Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2013 (2000) (“The [Supreme] Court
has . . . reemphasized . . . that [plea bargaining] is ‘an essential part of the [criminal] process,’ but has
failed to articulate any principled justification for the practice of allowing criminal defendants to lose
their most fundamental rights.”); Doug Lieb, Note, Vindicating Vindictiveness: Prosecutorial Discretion
and Plea Bargaining, Past and Future, 123 YALE L.J. 1014, 1017–19 (2014) (discussing the debate about
the necessity of plea bargaining within the criminal justice system).
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institutional knowledge of the criminal justice system. Despite these
benefits, many legal scholars assert prosecutorial discretion is too broad and
gives prosecutors unchecked power.69
Whether wide discretion is positive or not is difficult to assess due to a
lack of transparency.70 Legal commentators have characterized the “black
box”71 of prosecutorial discretion as “dangerous”72 and “tyrann[ical]”73
because it is “unreviewed and its justifications are unarticulated.”74
Commentators also emphasize that “many decisions and actions of a
prosecutor are never recorded, or are recorded in documents that are difficult
69. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 295 (2011)
(“[P]rosecutorial power is unchecked by law and, given its invisibility, barely checked by politics.”);
Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative
Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869 (2009) [hereinafter Barkow, Institutional Design] (“There are currently
no effective legal checks in place to police the manner in which prosecutors exercise their discretion. . . .
In a government whose hallmark is supposed to be the separation of powers, federal prosecutors are a
glaring and dangerous exception.”); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58
STAN. L. REV. 989, 1049 (2006) (“A system where upwards of ninety-five percent of all convictions result
from pleas and where prosecutors make all the key judgments does not fit comfortably with the separation
of powers.”); Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon
v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2150 (2013) (“The U.S. criminal system is not truly adversarial
because prosecutors possess broad, unchecked power and therefore determine results in criminal cases
with little or no input from the defense.”). But cf. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American
Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1130 (2014) (noting critics of the U.S. criminal justice system
“argue that unfettered prosecutorial discretion and the ‘relative absence of efforts to standardize and
regulate charging practices’ lead to arbitrary charging decisions, often with an outsized impact on
minorities and the poor.”).
70. See Murray, supra note 27, at 226–27 (“Much of the prosecutorial accountability gap stems
from the difficulty of evaluating performance,” as well as “community confusion ‘about the
prosecut[orial] function . . . .”); David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected
Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647, 671 (2017) (arguing the public lacks the ability to evaluate
prosecutorial function due to a “lack of transparency”); Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, Are Prosecutors the
Key to Justice Reform?, ATLANTIC (May 18, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2016/05/are-prosecutors-the-key-to-justice-reform/483252 [https://perma.cc/HL6Y-RM4Y] (discussing
the difficulty of procuring prosecutor charging data, and noting that in 2016, the Manhattan district
attorney’s office was the only office that permitted outside access to its files).
71. Wright & Miller, supra note 30 (characterizing this lack of transparency as a “Black Box”);
Wright et al., supra note 38 (same).
72. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1940)
(“Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that he thinks he should
get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted.”); see also Bennett L. Gershman, The New
Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 408–09 (1992) (“Uncontrolled discretion . . . has the potential for
abuse. In the hands of prosecutors, this potential is now a reality.”).
73. Henderson v. United States, 349 F.2d 712, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting);
see also Davis, supra note 56, at 399 (noting that “[t]he current constitutional design is dysfunctional as
a check on prosecutorial power”).
74. Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1073 (1972); see also Carrie Leonetti, When the
Emperor Has No Clothes III: Personnel Policies and Conflicts of Interest in Prosecutors’ Offices, 22
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 55 (2012) (“[U]nreviewed prosecutorial discretion makes a nasty
cocktail when mixed with invidious forms of prosecutorial conduct.”).
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to obtain.”75 And prosecutors have no reason to open up their decisions for
review.
Despite the difficulty of obtaining data on prosecutorial
decisionmaking, the next Section explores what we know empirically about
the role of prosecutors in mass incarceration, particularly in the last ten to
fifteen years.
B. DEBATES ABOUT PROSECUTORS’ ROLE IN MASS INCARCERATION
John Pfaff claims that prosecutorial discretion is the single largest cause
of mass incarceration and is responsible for the expansive growth in felony
convictions since the 1970s.76 His claim is controversial because it focuses
on admissions and disregards the other piece of the mass incarceration
equation: sentence lengths.77 Pfaff points out that violent crime increased by
100% between 1970 and 1990, and the number of line prosecutors (those
who try cases) rose by 17%.78 According to Pfaff, when crime rates fell from
1990 to 2007, “the number of line prosecutors rose by 50%,” and the number
of prisoners also increased.79 Unlike the fluctuating volume of arrests during
this period,80 “felony case filings tracks the number of [prison] admissions
quite closely.”81 However, such a historical comparison must be viewed with
some caution, as the National Center for State Courts (“NCSC”) data
underwent methodological changes in 2003.82 Pfaff demonstrates that in his
thirty-four state sample, between 1994 and 2008, filings grew 34% and
75. Ronald F. Wright, Kay L. Levine & Marc L. Miller, The Many Faces of Prosecution, 1 STAN.
J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 27, 45 (2014).
76. John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1239,
1240 (2012) (concluding that prosecutors are the “who” behind prison growth in the United States due to
the number of felony filings per arrest); LOCKED IN, supra note 12 (“Recall that over the 1990s and 2000s
crime fell, arrests fell, and time spent in prison remained fairly steady. But even as the number of arrests
declined, the number of felony cases filed in state courts rose sharply. In the end, the probability that a
prosecutor would file felony charges against and arrestee basically doubled, and that change pushed
prison populations up even as crime dropped.”).
77. See discussion infra note 86.
78. LOCKED IN, supra note 12.
79. Pfaff, Growth in Prison Admissions, supra note 12, at 10.
80. During this same time period, arrests went down slightly from 1990–1993, went up from 1994–
1998, dropped again until 2003, and then increased from 2004–2006. After peaking in 2006, arrests have
declined through 2019. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (publishing data annually, including from 1990–1994); Crime
Data Explorer: Arrest, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://crime-data-explorer.app.cloud.gov/
pages/explorer/crime/arrest [https://perma.cc/Y3D9-X3TW] (including data from 1995–2016); FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/publications [https://perma.cc/8LME-W7C8] (listing data
from 2017–2019).
81. Pfaff, Growth in Prison Admissions, supra note 12, at 10.
82. See infra note 96.
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admissions grew 40%.83 Pfaff claims that the prosecutor’s decision to file
charges appears to be at the “heart of prison growth.”84 Pfaff claims that
particularly with violent crimes, prosecutors were especially tough.85 Pfaff
argues that this may explain the central paradox of mass incarceration: fewer
crimes, more criminals; less wrongdoing to imprison people for, more people
imprisoned. Put simply, Pfaff blames prosecutors for mass incarceration over
any other leading cause.
While Pfaff’s claims are provocative, two scholars provide serious
challenges to his empirical analysis: Jeffrey Bellin and Katherine Beckett.86
Jeffrey Bellin challenges Pfaff’s assertion that prosecutors are the reason for
mass incarceration, stating that “few can persuasively explain how the
phenomenon arose or what can be done to make it go away.”87 Bellin
specifically takes on two of Pfaff’s arguments: (1) American prisons filled
through increased admissions, not longer sentences, and (2) felony filings
were the one variable that changed with respect to admissions. Bellin and
Beckett both dispute Pfaff’s assertion that more felonies were filed, but
sentence lengths did not increase between 1980 and 2010.88 Indeed, other
researchers have found dramatic increases in sentences between 1980 and
2010.89 Bellin also claims that the increase in felonies reported by Pfaff is
83. Pfaff, Growth in Prison Admissions, supra note 12, at 10; see also PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra
note 12.
84. PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12, at 110.
85. Id.
86. See Katherine Beckett, Mass Incarceration and Its Discontents, 47 CONTEMP. SOCIO. 11, 20
(2018) (reviewing JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017)) (“[I]t is difficult, perhaps impossible, to assess the reliability of
Pfaff’s findings regarding the apparent increase in the filing-to-arrest ratio. . . . The available
evidence . . . suggests that the share of felony filings that resulted in a felony conviction did increase and
therefore that prosecutors’ filing decisions were not the only cause of the increase in the arrest-toadmission ratio.”).
87. Bellin, supra note 58, at 836, 850 (“Broader criminal laws, tougher sentencing rules, harsher
judges, and a diminished likelihood of release on parole all increase the probability of convictions and
severe sentences. The plea deals prosecutors offer, and defendants agree to, undoubtedly reflect those
changes, leading to increased prison admissions and time served.”).
88. Id. at 844; Beckett, supra note 86, at 17 (“Studies . . . consistently find that time served did
increase notably in recent decades, especially in the 1990s.”); see STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A.
STOLL, WHY ARE SO MANY AMERICANS IN PRISON? 66 (2013) (calculating the average sentence length
in 1985 as compared to 2000 and 2009).
89. According to the National Research Council, the estimated increases in time served for
individual categories of crimes are as follows: murder—238% (1981–2000); sexual assault—94% (1981–
2009); drugs—19% (1981–2000); aggravated assault—83% (1980–2000); burglary—41% (1980–2000);
robbery—79% (1980–2000). NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 2, at 53. The
Council concluded that the increase in incarceration rates “can be attributed about equally to the two
policy factors of prison commitments per arrest and increases in time served.” Id.; see also RAPHAEL &
STOLL, supra note 88, at 51 tbl.2.4 (finding that the average time served for murder and negligent
manslaughter increased by 55%, 44% for robbery, and 21% for burglary between 1984 and 2004); Alfred
Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980–1996, 26 CRIME & JUST. 17, 36
(1999) (“There seem also to be upward trends [in time served] for [burglary, sexual assault, other assaults,
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questionable when State Court Processing Statistics (“SCPS”) data is
considered alongside NCSC data.90 However, Pfaff defends his data,
claiming that the state felony filings did in fact go up during this period and
that the data he relies on is the most representative.91 In addition, the last
SCPS report was published in 2009, limiting the ability to compare the two
data sets moving forward.92 Bellin, however, notes a study of federal
prosecutors conducted during a similar period did not find any increase in
felony charging,93 and California reported no increase in felony filings
during this period.94 Given this criticism, there is some dispute as to whether
prosecutors increased felony filings over the time period alleged, and
whether they are the largest contributor to mass incarceration.
We do not insert ourselves in this empirical debate on whether
historically prosecutors are a bigger cause of mass incarceration than other
criminal justice actors like police, judges, or legislators. But we are interested
in the current dynamics and persistence of mass incarceration. Also, while
mass incarceration typically is seen as having two components—admissions
and sentence lengths—we focus on admissions. To do this, instead of
examining only felony data, we examine total criminal filings (meaning both
felony and misdemeanor filings) to see what trends we can observe with
and robbery], each rising steadily in the 1990s.”); LEIGH COURTNEY, SARAH EPPLER-EPSTEIN,
ELIZABETH PELLETIER, RYAN KING & SERENA LEI, URBAN INST., A MATTER OF TIME: THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF RISING TIME SERVED IN AMERICA’S PRISONS 1 (2017), https://apps.urban.org/
features/long-prison-terms/a_matter_of_time.pdf [https://perma.cc/9X4L-PZTB] (“Since 2000, average
time served has risen in all 44 states that reported complete data to the National Corrections Reporting
Program.”); PEW CTR. ON THE STS., PEW CHARITABLE TRS., TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST, LOW
RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 3 (2012), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2012/
06/06/time_served_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3R5G-YR9G] (finding time served between 1990 and
2009 increased by 37% for violent crime, 24% for property crime, and 36% for drug crimes).
90. Bellin points out that it may be helpful to cross-check NCSC data with SCPS data on felony
filings. See Bellin, supra note 58, at 843. However, the comparison could prove unilluminating. SCPS
data is generated through a sample of felony cases processed on randomly selected business days in May
in 40 of the nation’s 75 largest counties. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FELONY DEFENDANTS
IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES 33 (2013). With NCSC, states voluntarily send
in the caseload numbers, with some states reporting how many cases are felonies and how many are
misdemeanors. Court Statistics, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., https://www.ncsc.org/services-andexperts/areas-of-expertise/court-statistics [https://perma.cc/656T-4LDE]. NSCS felony numbers are not
a statistically designed survey, but rather self-reported numbers that NCSC brings together. In some years,
twenty-eight states report felony filings, other years forty report. It would be difficult to use the states
provided by NCSC in a year SCPS also collected data and make them represent similar jurisdictions to
allow for comparison.
91. John F. Pfaff, Prosecutors Matter: A Response to Bellin’s Review of Locked In, 116 MICH. L.
REV. ONLINE 165 (2017).
92. Data Collection: State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS), BUREAU JUST. STAT.,
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=282 [https://perma.cc/TV9J-EL2S].
93. Bellin, supra note 58, at 844; RAPHAEL & STOLL, supra note 88, at 62 (concluding a study of
federal charging behavior between 1985 and 2009 revealed “little evidence of systematic change in the
rate at which U.S. attorneys prosecuted criminal suspects”).
94. Bellin, supra note 58, at 844.
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prosecutor charging.95 As a frame of reference, among states that report
felony and misdemeanor data, around 70% of criminal cases are
misdemeanor cases, while 30% are felony cases.96 Today, any meaningful
analysis of mass incarceration must consider the role of misdemeanors.97
Some elementary analysis shows that the trend for filings by
prosecutors has reversed from what Pfaff argues. Starting in 1990, the NCSC
reported that there were an estimated 13 million total criminal case filings
and by 2002, case filings went up to 15.4 million.98 While historical
comparisons before and after 2003 are discouraged due to methodology
changes by the NCSC,99 we can look at the period beginning in 2003. In
95. NCSC numbers are the best nationally representative numbers we have on felony and
misdemeanor filings. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., STATE COURT GUIDE TO STATISTICAL
REPORTING 1 (2020) (“Comparable data from the state courts allows the [Court Statistics Project (“CSP”),
a joint project participated in by the NCSC,] to publish national trends and analyze caseload statistics for
use by state court leaders, policy makers, and local court managers.”). Criminal caseload filings are cases
filed in trial court. CSP does not combine trial and appellate caseloads. “The national totals
reported . . . may include estimates for states that were unable to report caseload data in time for
publication or whose data do not strictly conform to the reporting guidelines set forth in the State Court
Guide to Statistical Reporting”; however “[s]tates for whom estimates were used will not appear in any
state-level tables . . . or any displays available on the CSP DataViewer.” NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
STATE COURT CASELOAD DIGEST: 2018 DATA 4 (2020) [hereinafter CASELOAD DIGEST 2018]. Note that
the national numbers in this section are referred to by NCSC as the “Number of Incoming Cases” in their
reports, see id. at 7, but this paper uses the term “filings.” NCSC defines incoming cases as “the sum of
new filings plus reopened and reactivated cases,” a figure it says offers “a more complete assessment of
the work of state courts.” NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2004,
at 42 (Richard Y. Schauffler et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter STATE COURTS 2004]. For more details, see id.
at 39–49 (for instance, the three-state example that NCSC shows that “new filings” are the vast majority
of “filings” as we refer to them). As defined in NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., STATE COURT GUIDE TO
STATISTICAL REPORTING 14 (2020), a “filing” is the original charging document (such as a complaint,
information, or indictment) and marks the beginning of the case. “Reopened” cases are those “in which a
judgment has previously been entered, but which have been restored to the court’s active pending
caseload due to the filing of a request to modify or enforce that existing judgment . . . .” Id. at 17. Finally,
“reactivated” cases are those cases moving from an inactive to an active status. Id.
96. This is according to data from NCSC. Only some states break down their reporting into felony
and misdemeanor cases, meaning the breakdown of the felony or misdemeanor numbers may not be
accurate as a national number from year to year. See CASELOAD DIGEST 2018, supra note 95. While there
is not a national felony filing number, NCSC does publish state-level information on those states that do
report felony case numbers. For example, in 2016 between 70–74% of cases were misdemeanors and 24–
28% were felonies among 31 states. See COURT STAT. PROJECT, STATEWIDE CRIMINAL CASELOAD
COMPOSITION IN 31 STATES (2016), http://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/24052/
ewsc-2016-crim-page-3-comp-by-state.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8NT-VPMW]. In 2018, looking at the
aggregate of thirty-two states, 77% of cases were misdemeanors, while 23% were felonies. CASELOAD
DIGEST 2018, supra note 95, at 13.
97. See NATAPOFF, supra note 14; KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 4.
98. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1990,
at 25 (1992); NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2003, at 11 (Brian
J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2004).
99. STATE COURTS 2004, supra note 96, at 9 (“The introduction or reallocation of case types as
defined in the Guide has had a subtle but discernable effect on the time-series data reported by the CSP.
For this reason, caseload trends in this year’s Examining the Work of State Courts are not necessarily
comparable to those published previously.”).
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2003, the criminal caseload was at 20.6 million cases and increased to 21.6
million cases at the height of mass incarceration in 2006.100 Since 2006, total
criminal case filings have steadily decreased, falling to 17 million in 2018.101
From 2006 until 2018, prosecutors charged less felonies and misdemeanors
each year than the year before, resulting in a 21.3% decline in filings.102
Therefore, contrary to Pfaff’s findings in the earlier period, after 2006,
prosecutors reduced charges filed each year.103 In other words, prosecutors
reduced their mass incarceration footprint between 2006 and 2018. As such,
Pfaff’s large mass incarceration claim of prosecutors increasing filings—if
true—ended in 2006. However, the story of prosecutors’ connection to mass
incarceration is not finished until we consider arrest rates.
In addition to prosecutor charging, we also consider how police arrests
have impacted the persistence of mass incarceration over roughly the last ten
to fifteen years. While prosecutors have filed fewer cases, arrests have
decreased at an even steeper rate in the same period. Indeed, the decrease in
prosecutor filings is not commensurate with the decrease in arrests, meaning
that while prosecutors have decreased filing, they have not decreased
proportionately to what we would expect given the sharp decline in police
arrests. In 2003, there were an estimated 13.6 million arrests in the United
States.104 Arrests increased to 14.4 million in 2006.105 After 2006, arrests
began to decrease steadily until 2018, when they dropped to 10.3 million.106
Overall, from 2006 to 2018, arrests decreased nationally by 28.3%.107 Figure
1 shows the decline in arrests and cases filed since 2006.108 Regarding the
100. Id. at 41; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2007, at 12
(Robert C. LaFountain et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter STATE COURTS 2007].
101. CASELOAD DIGEST 2018, supra note 95, at 7.
102. Calculation: [(17,000,000 – 21,600,000) / 21,600,000] * 100 = -21.3%.
103. While there was a slight rise in 2013, overall, from 2006–2018, filings have gone down. See
STATE COURTS 2007, supra note 100, at 12; CASELOAD DIGEST 2018, supra note 95, at 7.
104. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES, 2003, at 270 tbl.29 (2004). In 1994, arrests climbed to 14.6 million. FED. BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES,
1994, at 217 tbl.29 (2005).
105. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Estimated Number of Arrests (Table 29), CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 2006 [hereinafter CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2006], https://www2.fbi.gov/
ucr/cius2006/data/table_29.html [https://perma.cc/5PKV-W9W2].
106. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Estimated Number of Arrests (Table 29), CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 2018 [hereinafter CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2018], https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/tables/table-29 [https://perma.cc/Q9HM-UXCZ].
107. Calculation: [(10,310,960 – 14,380,370) / 14,380,370] * 100 = -28.3%. This trend of
decreasing arrest numbers had been going on for years prior to 2006, but less dramatically. From 1990–
2010 there was an 8% decrease in estimated arrest numbers (14.2 million in 1990 to 13.1 million in 2010).
HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ARREST IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990–2010, at 16 tbl.2
(2012). This includes the last ten years for which we have data, as the latest state criminal filings for 2018
were published in 2020.
108. For sources and calculations, see infra Appendix.
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discrepancies between the number of arrests and filings, there are a few
possible explanations. First, the additional filings could be due to parole or
probation revocation cases, meaning there was no new arrest, but there was
a new filing.109
FIGURE 1. National Estimates of Criminal Filings and Arrests, 2006–2018
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Second, in the last ten years or so, prosecutors have increased charging
rates per arrest. Comparing prosecutor filings and police arrests rates in the
last decade—police cut arrests much more than prosecutors reduced
charging rates. In the most recent years where data is available (2006–2018),
109. Incoming filings include probation violations, though they are not split out in the data, so it is
unclear what percent of filings such violations make up. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., STATE COURT
GUIDE TO STATISTICAL REPORTING 14–17 (2020). However, in 2011, parole violations made up 33% of
admissions and decreased slightly to 29% of admissions in 2019, indicating that parole violation filings
may have also decreased recently, but not as much as overall filings. See E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA
GOLINELLI, U.S. DEP’T JUST., PRISONERS IN 2012, TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991–2012,
at 2 (2013), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf; E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
PRISONERS IN 2019, at 13 (2013), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/p19.pdf. Overall, it is unclear how
much of a factor parole violations play in the decrease in criminal filings.
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arrests went down 28.3%.110 Prosecutors converted arrests into more
criminal case filings (felony and misdemeanor), but their rate went down
somewhat to 21.3%.111 This could mean that prosecutors are actually filing
more per arrest in 2018 than previously. As shown in Figure 2, in 2003 there
were 1.51 filings per arrest,112 which rose to 1.73 in 2013,113 before
plateauing in 2018.114 We acknowledge that FBI estimates are nowhere near
perfect given gaps in data collection.115 However, national trends show that
police have decreased arrests, but prosecutors have not shown a
commensurate decrease in felony and misdemeanor case filings. In other
words, prosecutors are disproportionately charging more cases than police
are arresting, and in so doing, are contributing more to mass incarceration
than police as far as admissions go.116
110. See CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2006, supra note 106; CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2018,
supra note 106.
111. See STATE COURTS 2007, supra note 100. From 2008–2017, criminal caseloads have dropped
a total of 18%. CASELOAD DIGEST 2017, supra note 18, at 9. According to NCSC, “[c]riminal caseloads
comprise person cases (including homicide), property cases, drug cases, weapons cases, DUI/DWI cases,
and others. The U.S. has seen state trial court criminal caseloads drop at an average annual rate of about
2 percent for the last 9 years. There was a slight increase reported in 2013 but caseloads continued the
decline in the following year.” Id.
112. STATE COURTS 2004, supra note 96, at 14 (20.6 million incoming criminal cases in 2003);
SNYDER, supra note 107 (13,646,642 estimated arrests in 2003). Calculation: 20,600,000 million
(Incoming Cases) / 13,646,642 (Number of Arrests) = 1.51 filings / arrest.
113. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW
OF 2013 STATE COURT CASELOADS 7 (2015) (19.5 million incoming criminal cases in 2013); FBI,
Estimated Number of Arrests (Table 29), CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2013, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crimein-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-29/table_29_estimated_number_of_arrests_united_
states_2013.xls [https://perma.cc/DYJ7-MKTZ] (11,302,102 estimated arrests in 2013). Calculation:
19,500,000 million (Incoming Cases) / 11,302,102 (Number of Arrests) = 1.73 filings / arrest.
114. CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2018, supra note 107 (10,310,960 estimated arrests in 2018);
CASELOAD DIGEST 2018, supra note 96, at 7 (17 million incoming criminal cases in 2018). Calculation:
17,000,000 million (Incoming Cases) / 10,310,960 (Number of Arrests) = 1.65 filings / arrest.
115. SNYDER, supra note 107 (showing reported arrests and estimated arrests differing by 2–4
million per year between 1990 and 2010, due to the percentage of agencies reporting ranging from 75–
88%). While arrest numbers are not perfect, according to the best national estimates, arrests decreased
28% between 2006 and 2018. Id.
116. See supra note 95 for discussion of NCSC data usage.
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FIGURE 2. Estimated Criminal Filings per Arrest, 2003–2018
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These trends, though taken with some degree of caution due to
persistent errors in reporting, demonstrate an important finding. Although
prosecutors have dramatically reduced case filings, their reductions should
be much more dramatic given arrest numbers. The question left unanswered
with the data is despite what we know about mass incarceration, why are
prosecutors continuing to charge in greater amounts, when crime and arrests
have gone down? That is to say, why have they not further reduced their
contribution to mass incarceration? Our empirical study in Part II provides
some insight on national prosecutor charging, but first we must understand
empirical work on prosecutor charging.
The next Section discusses the prior empirical studies on prosecutors
and their limitations.
C. LIMITATIONS OF PRIOR RESEARCH OF PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONS
Existing research on prosecutors has significant limitations and fails to
answer basic questions about prosecutor charging. How many crimes does a
prosecutor charge based on a single incident? How often do prosecutors
decline to charge a case when they have evidence to charge? When does a
prosecutor charge a felony when a misdemeanor will do? These basic
questions are left unanswered.
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Many existing studies are outdated or lack empirical rigor.117 For
example, some prior work is based on important, though anecdotal,
experience of a single prosecutor.118 And while several experiments have
studied prosecutorial decisions, including plea bargaining,119 most of these
have relied on lay persons as the subjects, rather than actual prosecutors.120
Some have treated prosecutors as economic actors by using game theory or
other economic theories to model hypothetical prosecutorial decisions.121
Others have looked at the organization of prosecutors’ offices to determine
117. See Wright et al., supra note 75, at 44–46 (recognizing some of the potential weaknesses of
such qualitative research).
118. See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2010) (describing
the challenges with race and police corruption in his experience as a prosecutor in Washington D.C.);
ALEXANDER, supra note 5 (describing the problems of mass incarceration and the “new racial caste
system” based on her experience as a civil rights lawyer).
119. Shawn D. Bushway, Allison D. Redlich & Robert J. Norris, An Explicit Test of Plea
Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial,” 52 CRIMINOLOGY 723 (2014) (demonstrating in an experiment
with 378 prosecutors that prosecutors offer and defendants accept plea bargains “in the shadow” of the
likely trial outcomes, such that the severity of the agreed punishment tracks the ease of proving guilt and
the heinousness of the crime); Wright et al., supra note 75, at 35 (referencing Milton Heumann’s studies
interviewing prosecutors finding that “prosecutors . . . started out their criminal justice careers in a highly
adversarial, trial-oriented mode, but slowly drifted into plea bargaining”); Wright & Miller, supra note
45, at 74 (testing the “screening/[plea] bargaining tradeoff” within the New Orleans District Attorney’s
Office and noting higher rates of open pleas and lower rates of charge bargains and dismissals than other
jurisdictions); Leonard R. Mellon et al., The Prosecutor Constrained by His Environment: A New Look
at Discretionary Justice in the United States, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52, 79–81 (1981); see infra
note 126.
120. Dan Simon, Doug Stenstrom & Stephen J. Read, Partisanship and Prosecutorial Decision
Making: An Experiment, Presentation at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law:
Fourth Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Nov. 20, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443562 [https://perma.cc/L5YL-T7H5] (determining with a study of lay
people that anger likely plays a role in prosecutorial decisions in a case); Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa
A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s
Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 28–43 (2013) (studying college students to
demonstrate that they would falsely admit guilt for something in return); Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe for
Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in
Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999, 999 (2009) (noting that “when people are judged
primarily for their ability to persuade others of their position, they are susceptible to defensive bolstering
at the expense of objectivity” and arguing that prosecutors are “particularly susceptible to biases that
undermine their ability to honor obligations that require some objectivity on their part”); Christoph Engel
& Alicja Reuben, The People’s Hired Guns? Experimentally Testing the Motivating Force of a Legal
Frame, 43 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 67 (2015) (using students as hypothetical prosecutors and studying in
a game theory experiment whether prosecutors risk taking a case to court and following their duty).
121. Oren Gazal-Ayal & Limor Riza, Plea-Bargaining and Prosecution, in CRIMINAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 145 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009) (conducting a law and economics approach to prosecutorial
decisions, including plea bargaining); Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Prosecutorial Resources, Plea
Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 149 (2001) (using game theory to
model prosecutorial plea bargaining and other decisions); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008) (modeling plea bargaining and arguing that quick pleas are preferred and do not
harm innocent defendants); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78
AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1988) (relying on game theory to understand plea bargaining and model
prosecutorial discretion).
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whether group dynamics impact decisions.122
Prior research has examined factors prosecutors consider when
deciding to file criminal charges in particular cases,123 and their decision to
dismiss or decline to pursue a case after charges have been filed.124 Much of
this prior work deals with sexual assault and murder cases, of which findings
are limited.125
Prior studies conflict on how often prosecutors decline to charge cases.
122. Mellon et al., supra note 120, at 79–81 (discussing how office management and organization
and community differences affect prosecutor charging and other decision patterns in a large study of
prosecutor offices in urban areas); Wright et al., supra note 75, at 40–41 (finding that prosecutors’ offices
with pyramidal organizational structures had “the greatest sense of team membership as well as a strong
staff loyalty to, and respect for, the administration,” whereas offices with flat organizational structures
“expressed low levels of regard for the administration and tended to conceive of themselves and their
coworkers in independent terms”).
123. See Celesta A. Albonetti, Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, and Uncertainty: Toward a
Theory of Discretionary Decision Making in Felony Case Processings, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 623, 623 (1986)
(“[C]ase information that decreases uncertainty concerning victim/witness management will increase the
probability of continued prosecution. . . . In addition, the data indicate that prosecuting attorneys are less
likely to continue prosecution of cases involving female defendants and are more likely to continue
prosecution of defendants whose bail outcome includes financial conditions for release.”); Eric P.
Baumer, Steven F. Messner & Richard B. Felson, The Role of Victim Characteristics in the Disposition
of Murder Cases, 17 JUST. Q. 281, 304 (2000) (finding that “victim characteristics affect the processing
of murder cases” and that “disreputable or stigmatized victims tend to be treated more leniently by the
criminal justice system”); Dawn Beichner & Cassia Spohn, Prosecutorial Charging Decisions in Sexual
Assault Cases: Examining the Impact of a Specialized Prosecution Unit, 16 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 461,
490 (2005) (concluding certain victim factors, such as risk-taking behavior and moral character,
functioned as predictors of prosecutors’ decisions to file charges by comparing a Kansas City sex crimes
unit to a nonspecialized Miami unit and finding “very few differences” between the two, with 49% in
Kansas and 47% in Miami resulting in prosecution); Cassia Spohn & David Holleran, Prosecuting Sexual
Assault: A Comparison of Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases Involving Strangers,
Acquaintances, and Intimate Partners, 18 JUST. Q. 651, 682 (2001) (“[V]ictim characteristics influenced
the decision to charge or not in cases in which the victim and the suspect were acquaintances, relatives,
or intimate partners.”).
124. VERA INST. OF JUST., FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK
CITY’S COURTS (1977); Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 251 (1980) (“[L]ess than one-fourth of the
complaints received by the ninety-four U.S. Attorneys appear to result in the filing of formal charges.”);
Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of
Predicative Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1445, 1497 (2004) (finding that “as federal criminal
justice resources have expanded, declinations have fallen” from 36% in 1994 to 26% in 2000); Kenneth
Adams & Charles R. Cutshall, Refusing to Prosecute Minor Offenses: The Relative Influence of Legal
and Extralegal Factors, 4 JUST. Q. 595, 600–01 (1987) (indicating that variables such as number of
charges, prior arrests, number or witnesses, value of stolen merchandise, gender, race, residence, and age
“have a statistically significant relationship” with the decision to prosecute); Carole Wolff Barnes &
Rodney Kingsnorth, 24 J. CRIM. JUST. 39, 46 tbl.5 (1996) (indicating that the percentage of cases rejected
at the outset is 16.4% for African Americans, 14.2% for Latinos, and 10.4% for Caucasians); Carl E.
Pope, The Influence of Social and Legal Factors on Sentence Dispositions: A Preliminary Analysis of
Offender-Based Transaction Statistics, 4 J. CRIM. JUST. 203, 203 (1976) (“The age, race, sex, and
previous criminal histories of felony defendants are considered with regard to sentence outcomes and the
length of both jail and probation commitments.”); Reilly, supra note 55 (example of limits on prosecutors’
ability to file or dismiss charges).
125. See Albonetti, supra note 124, at 623–44.
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Based on local data from 1978, Leonard Mellon, Joan Jacoby, and Marion
Brewer demonstrate that the declination rate of prosecutors in three cities
ranged from 43% in New Orleans to 4% in Brooklyn.126 A national study
from the 1980s asserted prosecutors dismissed around 50% of felony
cases.127 Yet a 1998 national study of state prosecutors and some of the latest
nationwide surveys found that prosecutors dismissed cases 25% of the
time.128 A declination study by Marc Miller and Ronald Wright
demonstrated high declination rates at about 52% in New Orleans over a
period of eleven years.129 However, a careful look at the Miller and Wright
study shows that when prosecutors declined to charge, it was because they
were charging some other crime, they lacked evidence or victim cooperation,
or they had some other legitimate reason.130 It is not clear in the study when
the prosecutor declined the charges, but, given the reasons for declining are
largely witness or evidence based, it may be that the prosecutors charged
initially and then dropped charges as they got further into the evidence.131
Importantly, most of the prior work is based on federal charging
decisions, which meaningfully differ from state charging decisions.132 State
126. Mellon et al., supra note 120, at 79 tbl.A (noting in Salt Lake City in 1978, prosecutors declined
to charge in 11.9% of cases.). Mellon et al. blame the differences in charging on the different policies,
goals, and backlogs of offices. Id.
127. BARBARA BOLAND, ELIZABETH BRADY, HERBERT TYSON & JOHN BASSLER, U.S. DEP’T
JUST., THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARRESTS, 1979, at 2 (1983) (roughly 50% of all cases “carried
forward,” meaning they were brought to trial or settled in plea bargaining); BARBARA BOLAND, PAUL
MAHANNA & RONALD SONES, U.S. DEP’T JUST., THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARRESTS, 1988, at 3
(1992) (roughly 55% of all cases carried forward); see also Frase, supra note 125, at 278 (filing in less
than 20% of federal criminal cases); Bellin, supra note 58, at 846 (referencing the findings from Barbara
Boland et al. in 1983).
128. See Travis W. Franklin, Community Influence on Prosecutorial Dismissals: A Multilevel
Analysis of Case- and County-Level Factors, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 693, 697 (2010) (using 1998 national
SCPS data for over 15,000 state felony defendants in seventy-five counties to find that “on average
prosecutors dismissed approximately 25 percent of cases,” that dismissals increased in some situations
with minority or poor defendants, and that politically conservative communities tended to be less likely
to dismiss cases). A study of federal prosecutors found that declinations went down from 36% in 1994 to
26% in 2000. Michael Edmund O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial
Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 252 (2003). Bureau of Justice Statistics reports reveal a postfiling felony dismissal rate of 29% in 1990, 27% in 1998, and 25% in 2009, although the dismissal rate
does not capture the total declinations for arrest. PHENY Z. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1990, at 13 tbl.15 (1993); BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1998, at 24 tbl.23 (2001); REAVES, supra note
91, at 24 tbl.21.
129. Wright & Miller, supra note 45, at 74 (“The prosecutors declined prosecution in 39% of all
cases received (or 52% of all charges) . . . .”).
130. Miller & Wright, supra note 30, at 136 tbl.1.
131. Id.
132. Kathleen F. Brickey, Charging Practices in Hazardous Waste Crime Prosecutions, 62 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1077, 1110 (2001) (“[Fe]deral [Resource Conservation and Recovery Act] prosecutions are based
not on a single isolated act, like disposing of a solvent-laden rag, but on a course of conduct that more
often than not involves multiple violations of several criminal statutes.”); Frase, supra note 125, at 274
(noting that “state offenses for which [] defendants were to be charged were not always direct counterparts
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charges constitute the vast majority of the criminal caseload. Despite the
relative importance of state prosecutors, many studies rely on federal
criminal cases and study federal prosecutors.133 While there are 93 U.S.
Attorneys, there are about 2,400 chief state-level prosecutors, most of whom
are elected locally.134 The federal criminal docket is largely made up of drug
crimes, firearms, and immigration cases.135 State prosecutors handle the
violent felonies like murder, rape, and robbery. In addition, cases filed by
state prosecutors constitute the biggest contributors to the U.S. prison
population.136 Given the larger volume of misdemeanors they handle, state
prosecutors could decline to prosecute more cases than federal prosecutors.
In order to adequately understand incarceration in the United States, it is
critical to study state prosecutors.137
While state charging practices have been studied empirically, these
studies rarely can explain why prosecutors make the decisions that they
of the federal charges”); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical
Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 501, 539 (1992) (“[Certain] sentences are much higher for offenders convicted in state court than
under the federal guidelines. . . . Defendants are willing to plead to the guideline sentence in order to
receive a shorter sentence than they would in state court and avoid the state prison system”); Rabin, supra
note 74, at 1058 (describing the guidance contained within the U.S. Attorney’s Manual with regard to
“state criminal penalties ‘overlapping’ federal penalties”); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea
Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in
the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1287 (1997) (examining how the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s 1987 sentencing guidelines impacted state systems); Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
893, 895 (2000) (objecting to the federalization of “crimes that have traditionally been prosecuted in state
court”).
133. O’Neill, supra note 124, at 1439; Frase, supra note 124, at 246. See generally Kyle Graham,
Crimes, Widgets, and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge Content, Pleas, and Trials, 100 CALIF. L.
REV. 1573 (2012); Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives
of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 627 (2005); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of
Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005); Michael O. Finkelstein, A
Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1975); Starr
& Rehavi, supra note 26.
134. See generally PERRY & BANKS, supra note 21; Lantigua-Williams, supra note 70; CARISSA
BYRNE HESSICK, UNIV. OF N.C. SCH. OF L., THE PROSECUTORS AND POLITICS PROJECT: NATIONAL
STUDY OF PROSECUTOR ELECTIONS (2020).
135. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018 [https://perma.cc/6ZQ4-QH4N] (reporting immigration
crimes constituted 29% of all criminal defendant filings, firearms and explosives crimes accounted for
13%, and drug offenses accounted for 31%).
136. Beckett, supra note 86, at 18 (“[B]y 1998, more than two-thirds of people admitted to U.S.
state prisons for a violent offense had been sentenced under a [truth-in-sentencing] law that required that
they serve at least 85 percent of their sentence . . . , and there is evidence that these statutes increased
both time served and prison populations . . . .”).
137. Wright, Levine, and Miller emphasize that state prosecutors handle “larger volumes of criminal
cases,” process the bulk of misdemeanor cases, and have a more “varied docket.” Wright et al., supra
note 75, at 31. “An understanding of the true impact and variety of criminal prosecution in the United
States, therefore, must give the state prosecutor a starring role rather than a bit part.” Id.
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do.138 Instead, the studies are focused on particular jurisdictions or types of
crime and lack many details because their source of data is based on court
records, written files, and budget data. None of these address the qualitative
questions of what the prosecutor is thinking, or why they do what they do.139
Still, there are many foundational qualitative studies of prosecutorial
138. Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 265 (2011) (relying on
“caseloads of prosecutors in some of the largest district attorneys’ offices in the nation”); Michael Kades,
Exercising Discretion: A Case Study of Prosecutorial Discretion in the Wisconsin Department of Justice,
25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 115, 121 (1997) (examining a unit within the Wisconsin Department of Justice
primarily responsible for prosecuting white-collar crime); Gary D. LaFree, The Effect of Sexual
Stratification by Race on Official Reactions to Rape, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 842, 844 (1980) (examining “the
effect of race composition on processing decisions . . . for 881 sexual assaults”); Cassia Spohn, Dawn
Beichner & Erika Davis-Frenzel, Prosecutorial Justifications for Sexual Assault Case Rejection:
Guarding the “Gateway to Justice,” 48 SOC. PROBS. 206, 208 (2001) (examining “prosecutors’ charging
decisions in sexual assault cases”); Elizabeth Anne Stanko, The Impact of Victim Assessment on
Prosecutors’ Screening Decisions: The Case of the New York County District Attorney’s Office, 16 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 225, 226 (1981) (discussing “prosecutors’ use of victim stereotypes during the screening and
charging stage of serious felony prosecutions” in the New York County prosecutor’s office in Manhattan);
Wright & Miller, supra note 45, at 36 (relying on charging and bargaining decisions within New Orleans
from 1988 to 1998); see also JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY
3 (1980) (noting prosecutors’ offices typically rely on “local representation applying local standards to
the enforcement of essentially local laws”).
139. Wright, Levine, and Miller state this problem best:
Nevertheless, archival research must live with critical blind spots. Countless important
moments in the criminal process are never recorded. The players record many other moments
for themselves, but only in paper files that remain unconnected to one another and out of reach
for all but the most persuasive and persistent researchers.
Wright et al., supra note 75, at 34. See generally Nicholas Petersen & Mona Lynch, Prosecutorial
Discretion, Hidden Costs, and the Death Penalty: The Case of Los Angeles County, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1233 (2012).

1152

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:1123

discretion.140 Except for a few,141 they are either somewhat outdated or
140. MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 11–14 (1978) (examining opinions on plea bargaining through seventy-one
interviews with judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys in Connecticut following the Supreme Court’s
Santobello decision and finding a willingness of court participants to discuss plea bargaining, a break
from the attitude in previous studies); PAMELA J. UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND
NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL COURT, at xi, xiv (1978) (finding that “while the inner dynamics of
negotiation push each side to objectively consider the other side, there are often pressures—such as public
apprehensiveness about crime, severe penal code, and illegitimacy of prosecutorial policy making—that
bind participants to rigid institutional roles” after fifteen months of field work in California’s San Diego
and Alameda counties); Alschuler, supra note 63, at 52 (interviewing prosecutors, defense attorneys, trial
judges, and other officials in ten urban jurisdictions, and arguing in favor of the abolition of plea
bargaining through “a comprehensive analysis of the guilty-plea system and its alternatives”); Donald J.
Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE SCI. 780, 781, 788 (1956) (concluding from a survey of ninety-seven felons convicted in one
Wisconsin jurisdiction that the majority of the convictions were the result of an informal bargaining
process between defense and prosecution); Mellon et al., supra note 120, at 5253 (concluding, based on
a study of ten geographically dispersed prosecutors’ offices, that differences in prosecution policy are
often mandated by environmental factors outside of the control of individual prosecutors); Lisa
Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and Gender Ideologies in
Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 531, 534 (1997) (finding that organizational concern
about the ability to convict in “discordant locales” was a frequent unofficial justification for case rejection
after observing and interviewing members of a sexual assault unit of a prosecutor’s office in a major
metropolitan area on the West Coast). See generally FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION
TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1969) (concluding that the role of the executive and the judiciary
in charging needs to be reevaluated based on the results of a field study of cities and rural areas in
Wisconsin, Kansas, and Michigan from 1955 through 1957); PETER F. NARDULLI, JAMES EISENSTEIN &
ROY B. FLEMMING, THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS (1988)
(finding that plea negotiations are influenced by various factors—including charging practices,
prosecutorial screening, centralization of plea offers, judge shopping, and the frequency of sentence (as
opposed to charge) bargaining—following a multi-year study analyzing the decisions of the head
prosecutor in nine different offices).
141. One 2014 study relies on extensive interviews with 267 misdemeanor or felony prosecutors
conducted over a three-year period to determine how they view themselves and their roles. Wright et al.,
supra note 75, at 38. The authors conclude that using mixed-methodology studies will allow researchers
to better understand prosecution culture and better map prosecution behavior. Id. at 47. See Kay L. Levine
& Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1122–23 (2012), for an
earlier paper based on the same interviews that focuses on forty-two interviews with misdemeanor and
drug prosecutors from two metro areas in the Southeast and that suggests “a prosecutor’s professional
identity might affect, or be reflected in, the outcomes she achieves in criminal cases and the consistency
of those outcomes.” Id. at 23. Other recent studies rely on surveys, interviews, observations, and court
data. See Deirdre M. Bowen, Calling Your Bluff: How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Adapt Plea
Bargaining Strategies to Increased Formalization, 26 JUST. Q. 2, 6–7, 25–26 (2009) (providing
observations on forty-two plea negotiations and attorney interviews in Seattle, which demonstrated that
in a reformed plea bargaining system, neutrality did not materialize, prosecutors had more power than
under the traditional plea bargain model, and, while there was greater efficiency, it is not clear that justice
was achieved); Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equality
in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 691, 706–09, 745–46 (2006) (concluding from interviews
with California deputy district attorneys that prosecutors operate in organizational settings, respond to
collective understandings about which cases are prosecution-worthy and why, and construct typologies
of offenders to manage large caseloads of similar events); Levine, supra note 17, at 1125, 1127, 1211–
14 (using mailed surveys and thirty interviews of statutory rape prosecutors in California to criticize the
“new prosecution” model—in which prosecutors take on additional roles such as counselor, legislator,
and investigator—for eroding the separation of powers); Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial
Disclosure in Practice After Connick v. Thompson, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 913, 916–17, 941–42
(2012) (describing interviews with New Orleans First District prosecutors and criminal justice actors
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localized.142 And even if they were current, they fail to answer the basic
questions we want to know about prosecutor charging.143
Several surveys have tried to gain some insight into prosecutor
decisions.144 But surveys may not allow for causal inference. The gold
standard is a field study or randomized controlled trial.145 But thus far, there
have not been any randomized controlled trials of prosecutor
decisionmaking; in fact, there have been only a few experiments.146 As
Wright, Levine, and Miller have astutely pointed out, prosecutors will be
tempted to offer a more flattering picture of their decisionmaking that may
not match up with their decisions in a real case.147 Indeed, some qualitative
research has failed to offer a “reliable portrait of the actual job performance
of the prosecutor.”148 As Wright et al. point out: “The best research settings
are those that allow researchers to confirm a prosecutor’s claims about
performance with a statistical record of that performance.”149 This is
important because individual prosecutors differ in demographics, career
regarding the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office’s compliance with defense disclosure obligations
following an increase in caseloads).
142. Wright et al., supra note 75, at 34 (discussing outdated studies). See supra note 136 for
localized studies.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 31–33.
144. See, e.g., BRUCE FREDERICK & DON STEMEN, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE ANATOMY OF
DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS OF PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING (2012) (relying on surveys, focus
group discussions, and court data from two jurisdictions to find that “prosecutors’ decisions were guided
by two basic questions: ‘Can I prove the case?’ and ‘Should I prove the case?’ ”); Don Stemen & Bruce
Frederick, Rules, Resources, and Relationships: Contextual Constraints on Prosecutorial Decision
Making, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 83 (2013) (finding that prosecutor decisions were shaped by internal
rules, external resource constraints, and interdependent relationships); Kim Banks Mayer, Comment,
Applying Open Records Policy to Wisconsin District Attorneys: Can Charging Guidelines Promote
Public Awareness?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 295, 307–08 (describing survey of Wisconsin prosecutors that
revealed hesitancy toward charging guidelines open to public access).
145. See generally, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson & Jason Sharman,
Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2014).
146. See CarlyWill Sloan, Racial Bias by Prosecutors: Evidence from Random Assignment (June
14, 2019) (unpublished paper, available at https://economics.nd.edu/assets/348622/sloan_jmp_
cels2019_143.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EQ4-AUA4]) (using randomization in assigning cases); Pilar CAF,
Lesbia Maris, Juan Vargas & Martin Rossi, Strengthening Prosecutors Capacities for Sexual Crime
Investigations: Evidence from Colombia (Sept. 27, 2018) (on file with the American Economic
Association’s Registry for Randomized Controlled Trials) (identifying studies that use randomization in
assigning cases).
147. Wright, Levine, and Miller elaborate:
Qualitative research centered on semistructured interviews of prosecutors has one significant
drawback that is particularly relevant to this research: it does not offer a reliable portrait of the
actual job performance of the prosecutor. The interviewee might talk about how she selects
charges or decides whether to take a case to trial, but that self-portrayal might not prove accurate
if the full statistical record were available. We recognize that many people are inclined to paint
themselves in the best light when talking to interviewers . . . .
Wright et al., supra note 75, at 44.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 45.
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goals, work quality, and experience.150 It is also important, as others have
recognized, to study offices of various sizes from a variety of regions, as well
as to question defense attorneys “for an alternative take on the work of
prosecutors in the jurisdiction.”151 Our study below attempts to avoid some
previous limitations of mixed methods studies and is the first national study
attempted of its kind.
II. NATIONAL PROSECUTOR STUDY
We designed a mixed methods study of prosecutor decisionmaking that
contained a web-administered questionnaire embedded with experimental
vignettes, close-ended questions, and open-ended questions. The vignettes
contained police reports describing an incident that ends in an arrest, and the
reports varied the race and class of the defendant. After reviewing the
reports, the prosecutor participating in our study was then asked to decide
whether to charge the individual with a crime (a felony, misdemeanor, or
both), whether to pursue a fine or imprisonment, and the amounts thereof.152
As part of the study, the prosecutors were also provided the opportunity to
write comments justifying their charging and punishment decisions and
describing how charging decisions are usually made in their local offices.
This Part summarizes the descriptive quantitative and qualitative results
of our mixed methods study. Some results from the experiment have been
published,153 but the normative implications of our survey results and the
qualitative analyses have not been published—until now.
A. SAMPLE
We sought to study real prosecutors. However, no comprehensive
database of U.S. prosecutors is available for research purposes, and initial
discussions with prosecutor organizations were unfruitful for research
collaboration. We reached out to the National District Attorneys Association
(“NDAA”) and the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section
about our study of prosecutors.154 The NDAA seemed open to cooperation
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Robertson et al., supra note 35, at 818–22. The vignettes contained different race and social
class descriptions of the individual to determine whether race and social class affect prosecutor
decisionmaking. We found no such effect. Id. at 826.
153. The first paper discussing this 2017 experiment discusses the lack of racial or socioeconomic
bias observed in prosecutor charging decisions. See Robertson et al., supra note 35, at 826. Other papers
that are forthcoming discuss other aspects of prosecutorial decisionmaking revealed by the study. Some
of the descriptions of the experiment in Sections II.A-D are taken from the Robertson et al. article.
154. See Criminal Justice Section, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
criminal_justice [https://perma.cc/EE3J-DMUF].
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until we showed them our study. They were concerned that our study could
reveal that prosecutors are racially biased.155 Without access to any national
prosecutor lists, we constructed a sample of state prosecutors by selecting
one to two states from each of the nine United States Census regional
divisions. Non-federal prosecutor names and email addresses were collected
from prosecutor office websites and state bar associations. To identify more
prosecutors, we sent FOIA requests to states to obtain additional prosecutor
names and contact information. Information was obtained for at least one
respondent from most states.
After collecting contact information for 4,484 prosecutors, we emailed
them an invitation to participate in the study.156 Respondents were told that,
“the purpose of this research study is to understand how prosecutors make
decisions.”157 In total, 541 prosecutors completed the study for a 12.09%
response rate.158
Although we did not conduct a random sample of prosecutors, the
profile of the respondents is representative of state prosecutors in several
ways.159 Nearly a quarter, 23%, of respondents were lead prosecutors,160 and
79% worked in the felony division. The length of time respondents served as
prosecutors ranged from less than a year to forty-five (45) years with a
median length of service of ten (10) years. Approximately 65% of the
respondents were men. Respondents ranged in age from twenty-six (26) to
seventy-seven (77), with a median age of forty-five (45). Ninety-six percent
of respondents were non-Hispanic, 90% were white, 4% were Black, 4%
were “other,” and the remainder were Native American or Asian. Few
respondents came from highly populous jurisdictions. Only 8% of
155. We did not find racial or socioeconomic bias, however. Id.
156. In 2017 and 2018, respondents received a link to the study hosted on Qualtrics and were offered
a five-dollar Amazon gift card for participating. See generally DON DILLMAN, JOLENE SMYTH & LEAH
CHRISTIAN, INTERNET, PHONE, MAIL, AND MIXED-MODE SURVEYS: THE TAILORED DESIGN METHOD
(4th ed. 2000) (offering nominal compensation improves response rates).
157. The protocol was approved by the University of Utah Institutional Review Board.
158. In our prior work, we reported experimental results from 468 prosecutors based on the
experimental portion of this study. In the prior study, if a prosecutor did not answer the question on their
recommended punishment, the prosecutor was excluded from analysis because that question was the
outcome of interest. We report on the full sample in this study because we are mostly focused on their
qualitative responses. If a prosecutor did not answer all questions, the prosecutor may still have provided
valuable information on their decision-making process. See Robertson et al., supra note 35.
159. Robertson et al., supra note 35.
160. Ronald Wright has suggested that because we had so many lead prosecutors, the sample might
have been skewed. Prior work has demonstrated that senior prosecutors tend to be more lenient than
junior prosecutors. See Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome,
56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1084 (2014) (concluding prosecutors with less experience were more likely “to
ignore the human dimension of many cases, approaching each file with a standardized view, focusing on
the need to punish everyone”). However, if there were such a skew, it would mean that our findings
regarding excessive prosecutor charging may be even more true of junior prosecutors.

1156

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:1123

respondents were in a jurisdiction of over 2 million, 11% in a jurisdiction of
between 1–2 million, 10% in a jurisdiction of 500,000–1 million, 28% in a
jurisdiction of 100,000–500,000, and 43% in a jurisdiction of less than
100,000. Due to differences in data availability and response rates, the
sample primarily consists of prosecutors from the Mountain (23%), East
North Central (21%), South Atlantic (16%), Pacific (12%), West North
Central (11%), and East South Central (9%) regions. Relatively few
respondents were from the New England, Mid-Atlantic, and West South
Central states. Additional information on the sample can be accessed in our
other publications.161
B. MIXED METHODS STUDY DESIGN
Study respondents first viewed hypothetical police reports. The police
reports in the study were purposely designed to allow a prosecutor to charge
major, minor, or no crimes at all. In the police report vignette, a slightly
intoxicated man is found in a subway station yelling obscenities, asking
people for money, and brandishing a knife. He is frustrated that no one will
give him money and reports having just broken up with his girlfriend to
police. At one point, he is angered that a certain woman does not give him
money after repeated requests and grabs her arm. He does not threaten her
specifically but does “dangle a knife at his side by his other arm.” The police
then arrive and arrest him. He has no prior criminal record.
The report describes a circumstance that can be viewed as assault or
potentially aggravated assault, depending on how the prosecutor understands
the situation and individual. The vignette is designed to allow for maximum
discretion of the prosecutor for optimal study of discretion. We also chose
assault as the crime because we are especially interested in how state
prosecutors charge in violent crime cases.162 Given the data-backed
argument that violent crimes fuel mass incarceration,163 we thought a violent
crime—though one that was marginal—would be helpful in determining
how prosecutors use their discretion. Nonetheless, we hypothesized that
maximal prosecutor discretion might be in a situation in which no victim is
physically harmed.164 We anticipated that some prosecutors would charge
the individual, and that many would refuse to charge given the lack of
physical injury. Prosecutors were also provided with an abbreviated
two-page (623-word) statutory code defining eight different crimes and
161. Robertson et al., supra note 35, at 823 tbl.1; see also Megan Wright et al., supra note 38.
162. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
164. We certainly appreciate that the fact scenario we devised may have caused emotional harm or
trauma to the victim.
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sentencing guidelines based on the laws of a real state, specifying the
punishment ranges for each crime.165 The study was designed to take
participants about fifteen minutes to complete.166
Respondents were first asked which charges they would apply, with
choices ranging from no charges to aggravated assault. Respondents then
indicated if they would press multiple charges. Next, respondents were asked
to “indicate which confinement term and/or monetary penalty, if any, you
would most likely seek in a plea deal with the suspect (i.e., the term and/or
penalty that would ultimately satisfy your pursuit of justice). In answering
this question, you may refer to the sentencing guidelines if you wish.”
Respondents had separate blanks for confinement and monetary penalties
and were also able to note suspension of these penalties. Most respondents
also provided additional comments justifying their charging decisions, which
we studied and coded separately. The vignettes manipulated the race and
social class of the defendant in order to assess whether these status
characteristics affected prosecutors’ decisions. We found no such effect. The
findings from the experimental part of the study have been previously
published.167
We also collected information regarding how prosecutors make
charging decisions, what information prosecutors need to make charging
decisions, information about respondents’ careers as prosecutors, and
demographic information, using both close-ended and open-ended questions,
the latter of which lent themselves to the qualitative analysis. We coded the
written responses both deductively (based on the type of questions we asked)
and inductively (based on themes that emerged from the data). We do not
discuss strengths and limitation of our study design in this Article, as they
have been addressed in prior work and will be discussed in future work.168
165. We relied on the Utah criminal code, but all participating prosecutors received the same sample
criminal code and were asked to charge based on that.
166. The case vignettes were manipulated between subjects in five conditions, a 2x2 factorial +
control design to test effects of the individual’s race (white versus Black) and social class (accountant
versus fast-food worker). In the control condition, race and class are redacted altogether in order to assess
differences from the baseline. Moreover, a control allows us to pilot test a potential blinding reform to be
used in the field, in which real prosecutors would make charging decisions without knowledge of these
extraneous factors of race and class. The results of this aspect of the randomized controlled experiment
are discussed in Race and Class: A Randomized Experiment with Prosecutors. Robertson et al., supra
note 35, at 822–43.
167. Id.
168. An in-depth discussion of the study’s strengths and weaknesses will be available in our
forthcoming article, Inside the Black Box of Prosecutor Decisions. Wright et al., supra note 38.
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C. STUDY FINDINGS
Our study provides insight into the prosecutor’s role in continuing mass
incarceration. For example, how many crimes do prosecutors charge based
on a single incident of the type recorded in the study vignette? How much
jail time do prosecutors propose on average for this type of incident, and
what is the range of fine amounts? How often do prosecutors choose to
decline charging? Is there national variation in the severity of charging?
Our study revealed several important findings, which we describe in
detail below. First, while the vast majority of respondents did not opt to
charge the most severe charge or impose incarceration or a fine, prosecutors
often filed multiple charges, which is indicative of severity. Of the
prosecutors who chose to charge a crime, 84% of prosecutors chose to charge
only misdemeanors and 16% clearly chose to file felonies and
misdemeanors).169
Second, the number of charges filed and the declination rate deviated
from expected outcomes. Based on prior research,170 we thought that more
prosecutors would impose no charges at all. We purposely provided a minor
crime with little actual harm caused but with a potential for serious crime to
be caused, and we described a suspect with no criminal record and obvious
circumstantial difficulties. Yet 97% of prosecutors in our study chose to
charge the suspect with either a misdemeanor or felony, and they charged
him with an average of three crimes. In contrast to our observed 3%
declination rate, prior studies have estimated 25–50% declination rates.171
This is probably the most significant finding that could help explain the filing
increases discussed in Section I.B. These results may also reveal what
prosecutors would like to charge, if they had the resources to do so.
Third, prosecutors imposed nonuniform punishments, even though they
were given the same criminal code and asked to charge based on those
standards. Some prosecutors in the same region fined a defendant $5,000 and
others imposed no fine. Some recommended five years of incarceration and
others only imposed community service. A few prosecutors recommended
no charge, and some recommended up to eleven charges. The national lack
of consistency or oversight of prosecutors is disturbing.
169. Some of the options for charges were clearly misdemeanors and others were felonies. The only
clear felony was aggravated assault. Sixteen percent of prosecutors charged this crime. However, there
were other crimes that could have been intended as felonies (felony harassment, for example). So, of the
84%, other prosecutors likely were choosing to charge misdemeanors, but we cannot be sure. We did not
consider these charges felonies in a choice to be conservative in the face of uncertainty. See Robertson et
al., supra note 35.
170. See sources cited supra notes 120–25 and infra notes 200–05.
171. See sources cited infra notes 208–22.
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The following Section will discuss the results in more detail.172 Figures
3–5 illustrate the results discussed below.
1. Number of Charges
Prosecutors could choose from eight possible charges: disorderly
conduct, loitering, public nuisance, criminal nuisance, harassment,
endangerment, assault, and aggravated assault. Prosecutors could select as
many charges as they thought appropriate and indicate if they would file
multiple counts of the same charge. Almost 97% of prosecutors filed at least
one charge. The mean number of charges was 3.16 [CI 2.98, 3.33], and
excluding the fifteen (15) prosecutors who declined to bring charges, the
mean number of charges was 3.26 [CI 3.09, 3.44]. The number of charges
ranged from one (1) to eleven (11) (the maximum number of possible
charges was sixteen (16)). The most common number of charges were two
(26%), three (20%), and four (15%).
We also found extremely wide heterogeneity in how prosecutors
resolved the exact same case, as illustrated in Figure 3. Although fifteen (15)
prosecutors resolved the case without pressing any charges, the modal
respondent imposed two charges, and some prosecutors sought seven or
more charges, topping out at eleven (11).
FIGURE 3. Number of Charges per Prosecutor
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See Robertson et al., supra note 35, in which some key results are published.
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2. Felony or Misdemeanor Charge
We examined whether a prosecutor would charge the defendant with a
felony versus a misdemeanor (or no charge at all).173 Only 16% of
prosecutors opted to charge the defendant with aggravated assault (the clear
felony available), whereas 84% opted for charges that were a misdemeanor
only (or could be either a felony or a misdemeanor). Thus, even though
prosecutors had the option to charge a felony, most chose not to.174
3. Monetary Penalty Recommendation
We also investigated whether a prosecutor would recommend a
monetary penalty, and if so, the dollar amount of the penalty. About 41% of
prosecutors opted to recommend a monetary penalty, whereas 59% opted for
no monetary penalty. The mean monetary penalty recommended, including
all prosecutors who recommended no monetary penalty, was $242.75 [CI
$191.90, $293.60]. Excluding prosecutors who did not recommend a
monetary penalty, the mean recommended fine was $640.25 [CI $530.77,
$749.73]. There were wide disparities in monetary penalty
recommendations. Of those prosecutors that recommended a monetary
penalty, the amount recommended ranged from $10 to $5,000. The most
common recommended amount was $500 (55/160 prosecutors
recommended a $500 fine) with other common recommendations of $100,
$200, $250, $750, and $1,000, as illustrated in Figure 4. The modal
respondent sought $500 or less. Some of the qualitative responses on the
monetary penalty will be discussed later.
173. As noted above, we also studied whether the charges were dependent on race or socioeconomic
status of defendant. See Robertson et al., supra note 35, for findings.
174. One advantage of our study design is that respondents were able to explain the reasons for their
charging decisions. Many prosecutors took advantage of this opportunity. Of these respondents, thirtyfive prosecutors said that they might increase or decrease charges depending on defendant cooperation.
Twenty-nine respondents said they would charge a felony but allow the suspect to plead to a misdemeanor
Three respondents would have filed multiple charges but offered a plea to one felony charge in favor of
dropping additional misdemeanor charges. Five respondents said they would charge multiple
misdemeanors but allow the suspect to plead to a single misdemeanor charge. Ten respondents said they
would charge multiple counts at various levels in order to expand plea options.
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FIGURE 4. Monetary Penalty Recommendation
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4. Confinement Recommendation
Next, the study examined whether a prosecutor would recommend a
term of confinement, and if so, the minimum days of confinement. About
27% of prosecutors recommended confinement, whereas 73% opted for no
confinement. The mean recommended minimum time of confinement,
including prosecutors who recommended no confinement, was just over 21
days (21.40, CI [15.02, 27.79]). Excluding prosecutors who did not
recommend confinement, the mean was 80.17 days [CI 59.51, 100.83].175 Of
those prosecutors that recommended confinement, the minimum number of
days of confinement recommended ranged from 1 to 720 days, and the most
common recommended amount was 30 days (31/122 prosecutors
recommended) with common recommendations of 10, 90, and 180 days.
Confinement results are shown in Figure 5 below. Most strikingly, we saw a
wide disparity in prosecutors’ decisions with many prosecutors resolving the
case without any jail time while others demanded a month, or even five years
in one case. Some of the qualitative responses on confinement will be
discussed later.
175. Id. If nine extreme values are recoded to a maximum value of 95% percentile of the
distribution, or 180 days, when prosecutors recommend confinement, the mean minimum number of days
recommended becomes 63.05 [CI 51.15, 74.95].
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FIGURE 5. Minimum Days of Confinement

720
180 to 365
91 to 180
31 to 90
11 to 30
10 or less
zero
0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Number of Prosecutors

D. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Our national study of prosecutor decisionmaking illuminates a few key
findings. Prosecutors charged a crime more often than we expected
considering the estimates of prior studies,176 and rarely declined to charge.
In addition, prosecutors were harsher with confinement and fines than may
have been warranted. While it might be reassuring that prosecutors only
charged the most serious crime 16% of the time, given the absence of
physical harm and the defendant’s lack of criminal history, we were
surprised that 97% of prosecutors charged any crime in this scenario and that
the majority of prosecutors charged between two to four charges. The
decision to file multiple charges could be for plea bargaining purposes, as
prosecutors may have decided to charge everything they reasonably could
with the idea that some charges could be bargained away during plea
negotiations.
It is not just the number of charges that indicate severity. While about
70% of prosecutors in our study indicated that confinement was not
appropriate, those who did recommend confinement most commonly
suggested thirty days. To put these findings into perspective, thirty days of
confinement has the average cost to defendants of $11,400 and could mean
176. See sources cited supra notes 126–29. Further discussion of this finding will be undertaken in
future work.
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the loss of employment, family, and housing.177 Of all prosecutors surveyed,
41% recommended a monetary penalty, with the most common fine imposed
being $500. The fine of $500, which may not seem draconian to a whitecollar professional, is more than the average American has in savings.178
These findings could demonstrate that prosecutors may be out of touch with
the life circumstances of an average defendant.
We purposely gave prosecutors a scenario that was borderline and
potentially understandable: a younger defendant with no criminal record who
apparently had been drinking after a breakup, dangling a knife but not
brandishing it or causing any injury. It could have involved a simple
discussion with the suspect and his attorney, avoiding the creation of a record
for the suspect. However, only 3% of prosecutors declined to charge the
defendant. Indeed, almost every prosecutor charged the defendant with a
crime, and the average number of crimes charged was three. What is
significant about this is that the suspect in this scenario obtains a criminal
record that could carry with it collateral consequences, sometimes for life in
cases of felony charges, and could impact his employment prospects,179 even
if the charge is later dropped. We recognize that the decision to charge may
be complicated and not be driven simply by sympathy for an individual or
concerns about evidence, but also by many other factors that affect the
decision to charge a case. Evidentiary issues could doom a marginal case,
while a sympathetic case with strong evidence may be charged.
Another key finding is that prosecutors demonstrated little uniformity,
with some proposing a fine of $5,000 and others imposing no fine, even
though they were given the same sample criminal code. Some recommended
five years of prison time while others imposed community service. A few
prosecutors recommended no charge, and some recommended up to eleven
years. While maintaining individual discretion may be important for
prosecutors, it may be surprising to the public to learn that the results could
be so different depending on the prosecutor they happen to encounter.
Finally, and probably most importantly, the prosecutor decisions we
177. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16 tbl.3 (2017)
(discussing the economic studies tallying the costs borne by a defendant during pre-trial incarceration).
178. Kathryn Vasel, 6 in 10 Americans Don’t Have $500 in Savings, CNN MONEY (Jan. 12, 2017,
8:21 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/01/12/pf/americans-lack-of-savings/index.html [https://perma.
cc/2GVA-2PLU]; see also JEFF LARRIMORE, SAM DODINI & LOGAN THOMAS, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2015, at 1
(2016) (“Forty-six percent of adults say they . . . could not cover an emergency expense costing
$400 . . . .”); PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE ROLE OF EMERGENCY SAVINGS IN FAMILY FINANCIAL
SECURITY: WHAT RESOURCES DO FAMILIES HAVE FOR FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES? 1 (2015) (“One in 3
American families reports having no savings at all, including 1 in 10 of those with incomes of more than
$100,000 a year.”).
179. See discussion of collateral consequences supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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witnessed may have parallels in the real world and may impact incarceration
rates. It is possible that the dramatically low rate of declination and much
higher rates of severe punishment we witnessed in our study are also found
in real cases these prosecutors are handling. The high rates of prosecutor
charging in this study could indeed explain the higher ratio of prosecutor
charging to police arrests over the last ten years. The extremely low
declination rate by prosecutors (3%) may also be a good indicator that the
cases being dismissed are for evidentiary or witness-related reasons
discovered later in the case. This finding indicates that prosecutors may be
declining cases not due to the prosecutor’s progressive desire to cut
incarceration rates or mercy for an individual, but because their case is
simply not viable, especially when faced with a heavy caseload.180 The fact
that prosecutors were harsher overall and declined to prosecute much less
than anticipated supports the idea that prosecutors are a key contributor to
mass incarceration. It also supports recent data that prosecutors have not
eased up on charging like police have eased on arrests—and that despite the
reduction in crime, prosecutors continue to charge with impunity. The
implications of these findings are discussed in more detail in Part III.
III. PROSECUTOR IMPACT ON MASS INCARCERATION
We learned through our nationwide study that prosecutors may be
harsher, less uniform, and less likely to decline cases than we might have
expected based on earlier studies.181 There are many ways to further
understand these findings. One approach would be to reconcile prosecutor
actions with anticipated behavior to understand whether prosecutors are
acting appropriately given public expectations. These findings could also be
understood as revealing what a prosecutor would charge, without other realworld factors such as burdensome caseloads, limited office resources, and
victim input. Another approach would be to consider, from a punishment
theory standpoint, the typical prosecutor punishment and examine whether
it is fitting for the crime. Yet another approach is to understand prosecutor
actions and compare them to how scholars might predict prosecutors would
act in this situation. Another potential approach would be a prescriptive one:
we know what is wrong with prosecutors, so how do we begin to fix it? While
all of these approaches are important and should be undertaken in time, the
first question we want to ask is whether prosecutors generally acted lawfully
and appropriately. In essence, did prosecutors get it right?
To determine whether prosecutors were generally on the right track, we
180. See supra note 144 (exploring how caseloads and other external factors impact prosecutor
decisionmaking).
181. See supra notes 126–29.
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compare their actions to the leading national prosecutor standards—the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) and the NDAA—and Supreme Court
guidance on prosecutorial discretion. ABA and NDAA standards provide
guidance for state prosecutors nationwide on all aspects of their duties182 and
are the most widely accepted national standards for prosecutor behavior.183
Judging prosecutors by publicly accepted standards and Supreme Court
precedent—though still subjective—creates a generally accepted basis by
which to consider prosecutor behavior. We recognize that some prosecutors
operate under internal guidelines or personal standards that may trump the
standards indicated below.184
This Part explores whether prosecutor behavior is aligned with
governing standards and caselaw and how their decisions impact mass
incarceration. In order to answer these questions, we break down the
empirical findings of Part II into three categories: the decision to charge or
not to charge, the severity of the charge, and the uniformity of prosecutor
decisions. Section III.A discusses the national guidance on the decision to
charge or not charge a crime. Section III.B reviews the guidance on severity.
Section III.C discusses the guidance on uniformity. Section III.D covers the
implications of these standards regarding prosecutors, the lack of
transparency, and the effects of prosecutor decisions on mass incarceration,
ultimately arriving at two important conclusions. First, under Supreme Court
precedent and national prosecutor guidelines, prosecutors are completely
within their purview and are even arguably adhering to best practices in their
charging decisions. There are not even loose recommendations against the
severity or disparity in charging we witnessed in our study. Second, and most
importantly, prosecutor’s decisions are critical to mass incarceration. Given
the lack of data or transparency in charging, prosecutors are likely unaware
that their individual decisions are collectively contributing to mass
incarceration in America.
182. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(a) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017); NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-2.1 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009).
183. The ABA is the oldest and largest organization of attorneys in the United States and sets forth
prosecution guidelines. See supra note 182. The NDAA, a nationwide association of prosecutors formed
in 1950, has more than 5,000 members and “represents state and local prosecutors’ offices from both
urban and rural districts, as well as large and small jurisdictions.” About NDAA, NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS
ASS’N, https://ndaa.org/about/aboutndaa [https://perma.cc/RT6J-9LUL]; see also NAT’L PROSECUTION
STANDARDS § 4-2.1 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009).
184. We intend to address the issues surrounding prosecutors’ internal guidelines in a forthcoming
piece (on file with authors).
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A. THE CHARGING DECISION
The first question is what guidance Supreme Court precedent and
prosecutor standards give prosecutors on charging or declining to charge in
a given case. National prosecutorial standards seem to expect much more of
prosecutors than average attorneys yet expand their discretion. The ABA and
NDAA make clear that their standards are “aspirational” or “best practices”
and are not intended to serve as a basis of imposing “professional discipline”
or serving as a “predicate for a motion to . . . dismiss a charge.”185 The
NDAA recognizes that the decision to charge is arguably the “most
important” made by prosecutors in the exercise of their discretion.186 NDAA
recognizes that the decision may put into play a prosecutor’s amorphous
“beliefs regarding the criminal justice system.”187 The ABA states that a
prosecutor should exercise “sound discretion” in performing her function.188
The ABA affirms that the primary duty of a prosecutor is “to seek
justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict.”189 Likewise, the
NDAA states that the primary responsibility of a prosecutor is to “seek
justice.”190 Scholars have recognized that prosecutors have very little
guidance as to what it means to “seek justice.”191 This phrase is purposely
vague and has been interpreted differently by different scholars and
prosecutors.192 For some prosecutors, obtaining convictions has been the
185. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.1(b) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017). The NDAA similarly points out that if someone does not follow the guidelines, it “may or
may not constitute an unacceptable lack of professionalism.” NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1
(NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009). “These standards are not intended to: (a) be used by the judiciary in
determining whether a prosecutor committed error or engaged in improper conduct; (b) be used by
disciplinary agencies when passing upon allegations of violations of rules of ethical conduct; (c) create
any right of action in any person; or (d) alter existing law in any respect.” Id.
186. Id. § 4-1 cmt.
187. Id.
188. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017).
189. Id. § 3-1.2(b).
190. NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.1 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009).
191. Bellin, supra note 17, at 1208–09 (remarking that prosecutors are not told what it means to
“seek justice”); R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About A
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 637–38 (2006) (same); Daniel
S. Medwed, supra note 26, at 43 (noting the “absence of guidance” in how prosecutors are to “seek
justice”); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 58 (1991) (noting the “relative independence” provided by the “do justice”
rule).
192. Green, Seek Justice, supra note 26, at 608 (describing the duty to “seek justice” as ill-defined,
protean, and vague); Ross Galin, Note, Above the Law: The Prosecutor’s Duty to Seek Justice and the
Performance of Substantial Assistance Agreements, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1266 (2000) (“ ‘[S]eek
justice,’ however, is vague and leaves a great deal of latitude for individual interpretation.”); Fred C.
Zacharias, supra note 191, at 48 (“The ‘do justice’ standard, however, establishes no identifiable norm.
Its vagueness leaves prosecutors with only their individual sense of morality to determine just conduct.”);
David Aaron, Note, Ethics, Law Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose
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definition of seeking justice.193 As Bellin argues, “seeking justice” is an
“analytical dead end” because justice is not concrete enough to create rules
for how discretion should be used.194
The Supreme Court has been very deferential to prosecutor discretion
and has affirmed the “seek justice” principles of prosecutor guidelines. In
Berger v. United States, the Court described a prosecutor as a “servant of the
law” whose interest is not to “win a case, but that justice shall be done.”195
The Supreme Court has made very clear that the number of charges,196
“[w]hether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring . . . are decisions
that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”197 The Court explained in
McClesky v. Kemp that “discretion is essential to the criminal justice
process” and that “clear proof” would be required to infer that a prosecutor
has abused this discretion.198 The Supreme Court has always supported a
prosecutor’s decision to refuse to prosecute in a given case.199 Courts, as well
as prosecutor guidelines, have described prosecutors as representatives of an
impartial government and have assumed that they are held to a higher
standard than other attorneys. This higher standard is accompanied by a
much higher level of discretion.
When it comes to declining cases, national prosecution standards are
somewhat agnostic. ABA standards make clear that a prosecutor “is not
obliged to file or maintain all criminal charges which the evidence might
support.”200 It also makes clear that the prosecutor’s discretion includes the
Nonevidentiary Information, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3005, 3027 (1999) (noting that the ethical standards
provide very few specific duties of prosecutors).
193. George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 109 (1975)
(noting nearly one-third of prosecutors in a study indicated that their primary job was obtaining
convictions); see also BRIAN FORST, JUDITH LUCIANOVIC & SARAH J. COX, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., WHAT
HAPPENS AFTER ARREST? A COURT PERSPECTIVE OF POLICE OPERATIONS IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA 1 (1978) (“[M]ore than 70 percent of the 17,534 arrests for felonies and serious misdemeanors
brought to the Superior Court in 1974 did not lead to conviction.”).
194. Bellin, supra note 17, at 1210; see also Griffin, supra note 27, at 307; Nugent-Borakove, supra
note 27. One scholar argues the ABA standards do not provide any limits. Melilli, supra note 17, at 681
(“The recommended threshold of the ABA Prosecution Standards—sufficient admissible evidence to
support a conviction—is likewise far too easily satisfied to provide any real limitation upon, or incentive
to exercise, case-specific evaluation by the prosecutor.”).
195. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
196. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 126 (1979).
197. Id. at 124.
198. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
199. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985) (discussing the judiciary’s hesitancy
to review prosecutorial decisionmaking); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[T]he
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in [the prosecutor’s] discretion.”).
200. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017). The ABA lists factors to consider in charging decisions as:
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ability to “initiate, decline, or dismiss a criminal charge.”201 The ABA, while
acknowledging that declination might occur within a prosecutor’s discretion,
does not encourage it.202 The ABA standards certainly go further than the
NDAA standards. NDAA states that the prosecutor should decide whether
initial charges should be pursued,203 and encourages a prosecutor’s office to
“retain a record of the reasons for declining a prosecution” where permitted
by law.204 However, when discussing charges, the NDAA standards typically
consider what charges would be appropriate for the offense or to “serve the
interests of justice.”205 Neither standard ever points out that declining to
charge may help reduce unnecessary cases, costs, pretrial detention, or
collateral consequences that cause mass incarceration.206 As a whole, neither
approach views declination of charges as a positive move for prosecutor
offices, defendants, or the public.
While some scholars have recognized declination as an important step
to reducing prison rates,207 many argue that declination presents a wide
variety of problems.208 “Declinations . . . , hidden from all traditional legal

Id.

(i) the strength of the case; (ii) the prosecutor’s doubt that the accused is in fact guilty; (iii) the
extent or absence of harm caused by the offense; (iv) the impact of prosecution or nonprosecution on the public welfare; (v) the background and characteristics of the offender,
including any voluntary restitution or efforts at rehabilitation; (vi) whether the authorized or
likely punishment or collateral consequences are disproportionate in relation to the particular
offense or the offender; (vii) the views and motives of the victim or complainant; (viii) any
improper conduct by law enforcement; (ix) unwarranted disparate treatment of similarly
situated persons; (x) potential collateral impact on third parties, including witnesses or victims;
(xi) cooperation of the offender in the apprehension or conviction of others; (xii) the possible
influence of any cultural, ethnic, socioeconomic or other improper biases; (xiii) changes in law
or policy; (xiv) the fair and efficient distribution of limited prosecutorial resources; (xv) the
likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction; and (xvi) whether the public’s interests in the
matter might be appropriately vindicated by available civil, regulatory, administrative, or
private remedies.

201. Id.
202. See id. § 3-1.2(e), (f). The ABA only goes so far as encouraging prosecutors to develop
“alternatives to prosecution or conviction” to solve broader criminal justice problems. Id. § 3-1.2(e).
203. See NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-1.1 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009) (noting that
if state law allows law enforcement or other persons to initiate criminal charges, the prosecutor should
still “decide whether the charges should be pursued”).
204. Id. § 4-1.7.
205. Id. § 4-2 cmt. (“The charging decision entails determination of the following issues: What
possible charges are appropriate to the offense or offenses; and What charge or charges would best serve
the interests of justice?”).
206. O’Neill, supra note 124, at 236 (“[D]eclination policies have both pragmatic, as well as
aspirational, components.”). The closest the NDAA Standards come to these considerations is their
recognition that “undue hardship . . . to the accused” is one factor that may be considering screening
decisions. NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-1.3 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009).
207. O’Neill, supra note 124, at 255–59 (noting budget restraints may call for prosecutorial
declination); Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1353 (2008) (noting a prosecutor’s “power to be lenient . . . permits mercy, and it
avoids flooding the system”).
208. Murray, supra note 27 (describing nonenforcement as a means to nullify opposed laws); Roger
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review”—yet fundamental to the operation of the American criminal justice
system—provide the ultimate test of whether “reasoned judgments . . . or
random choices” best describe “the day-to-day work of criminal
prosecutors.”209 Some scholars see declination as a potential reversal of the
rule of law and worry that it may be happening often.210 Indeed, some have
argued that declinations are on the rise in recent years.211 While there is little
evidence of this being a problem, there may be fear that prosecutors will
refuse to enforce the law and protect the public.212 Scholars see the power
prosecutors have in declining cases, and it seems to be viewed negatively.213
A. Fairfax Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1253 (2011) (defining “prosecutorial
nullification”); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671,
675–78 (2014) (arguing “categorical” nonenforcement policies are presumptively invalid); Robert J.
Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration
Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013) (describing executive
nonenforcement decisions as “effectively repealing” laws); Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the
Context of Immigration and Marijuana Law Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 183, 185 (2016) (“[T]he power to completely invalidate a criminal statute by categorically
refusing to enforce a validly enacted law is clearly beyond the authority of a prosecutor.”); Peter J.
Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 732–33 (1999)
(expressing disfavor for selective prosecution—or declination of the law in certain cases). But see Leigh
Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 TAX L. REV. 73, 75–76, 131–32 (2015)
(supporting nonenforcement in some circumstances).
209. Miller & Wright, supra note 30, at 130. Miller and Wright studied a database from New
Orleans between 1988–99 that covered “430,000 charges and about 280,000 cases (involving 145,000
defendants), filed or adjudicated between 1988 and 1999.” Wright & Miller, supra note 30, at 60 n.109.
There were a total of 217,267 charge declinations. Miller & Wright, supra note 30, at 136 tbl.1. We have
to look at this number very carefully. Of these charges, 37.8% (85,091 charges) were declined because
prosecutors opted to prosecute other charges, 18.4% (41,520 charges) were declined because the victim
would not testify or could not be located, 10.5% (23,606 charges) were declined because testimony was
insufficient to support the charge, 9.8% (21,961 charges) were declined because they were not suitable
for prosecution, and other miscellaneous reasons supported the rest of the 18% or so of declinations. Id.
There are very practical reasons prosecutors decided not to move forward with these cases. Even
considering the legitimate reasons above, only 45,000 cases or so remain and are covered by other
legitimate reasons like an insufficient nexus, faulty evidence, an unlawful search, aggregated charges, a
good defense, and so on. Id. The point of all of this is that cases were not declined for other reasons a
prosecutor might consider, like deciding that the law was unfair or because the defendant was poor or
sympathetic in some other way. It is difficult to figure out the declination rate in the Miller study.
However, given that there were 145,000 defendants and around 132,000 declined charges (meaning the
remaining 298,000 charges were presumably acted on), the overall declination rate seems quite low but
is unclear from the study, so no conclusions can be drawn on this point.
210. See Murray, supra note 27, at 176 (“[N]o one doubts that prosecutors sometimes may thwart
the law’s application where, by its letter, it would govern.”).
211. See id.; Jessica A. Roth, Prosecutorial Declination Statements, 110 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 477, 482 (2020); Benjamin Weiser, Should Prosecutors Chastise Those They Don’t
Charge?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/nyregion/bill-de-blasiocampaign-finance.html [https://perma.cc/P36P-BUG3] (claiming there is an “apparent trend” of
prosecutors willing to speak publicly about their declination decision in high-profile cases).
212. Murray has asked how often prosecutors nullify the law and discusses some problems with this
scenario. Murray supra note 27, at 176 (“The question is how far ‘sometimes’ goes. . . . [P]rosecutors are
beginning to stretch their power beyond mine-run resource-driven nonenforcement and one-off ex post
declinations in ‘anomalous cases’ of factual guilt.”).
213. Id.

1170

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:1123

Our study results track national guidance on declination and contradict
the perception among scholars that declinations are common or on the rise.
The prosecutors in our study rarely chose to decline to prosecute cases. Our
declination rate was only 3% (97% of prosecutors charged at least one
crime). Previous localized work on prosecutor declination estimated that
prosecutors decline to prosecute anywhere from 25% to 52% of cases.214 But
all previous studies of declination are retrospective; that is, previous studies
lack the ability to see what the prosecutor would charge initially, rather than
whether a prosecutor ultimately charges the case.215 Our study, in contrast,
tracks the initial charging decision. We were able to consider whether a
prosecutor would like to charge a case before the realities of poor evidence
or uncooperative witnesses come to bare. This provides an insight into the
preference of a prosecutor, which according to our study, is to charge a
defendant in almost every instance. This is not to say that our prosecutors
did not envision that charges would be dropped or sentences suspended,216
but it does demonstrate that prosecutors saw it as their duty to charge a crime
when they were presented with evidence of one. Prosecutors were thus in
line with charging-focused national standards.
B. SEVERITY IN CHARGING
The Supreme Court and national prosecutor guidelines are surprisingly
silent on prosecutor severity. We have heard very little from any of these
sources on what constitutes inappropriate harshness when it comes to
charging decisions.217 In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has
finally demonstrated that there is some bar against severe charging.
Starting with national prosecutor standards, there is very little guidance
on charging severity. While NDAA standards encourage prosecutors to
“screen potential charges to eliminate from the criminal justice system those
214. Wright and Miller’s New Orleans study found that prosecutors rejected “for prosecution in
state felony court 52% of all cases and 63% of all charges.” Wright & Miller, supra note 30, at 74.
According to Wright and Miller, New Orleans prosecutors said they declined an “exceptional” number
of cases and acknowledged that New Orleans is a unique jurisdiction in other ways, including that they
plea bargained less than 10% of cases and went to trial much more than other jurisdictions. Id. at 65; see
also supra discussion in Section I.A; VERA INST. OF JUST., supra note 125; Donald M. McIntyre & David
Lippmann, Prosecutors and Early Disposition of Felony Cases, 56 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 1154, 115657
(1970).
215. See supra notes 207–14 for discussion of Wright and Miller study and other declination
articles.
216. Indeed, some prosecutors indicated that they were planning to drop charges as part of the pleabargaining process. See Wright et al., supra note 156; see also supra notes 22–24; Robertson et al., supra
note 35, at 823 tbl.1.
217. See generally Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal
Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1107 (2005) (detailing the
harms of redundant charging).
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cases where prosecution is not justified or not in the public interest,”218 they
put little emphasis on encouraging prosecutors to consider the severity of the
punishment as compared to the harm caused.219 When it comes to severity
and declinations, the ABA standards declare that “[t]he prosecutor serves the
public interest and should act with integrity and balanced judgment to
increase public safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal charges of
appropriate severity, and by exercising discretion to not pursue criminal
charges in appropriate circumstances.”220 Unfortunately these standards do
not clarify what “appropriate severity” means.221
None of the standards encourage prosecutors to charge just one crime
when multiple charges could be considered.222 Nowhere in the standards
does it ask prosecutors to place a higher bar on charges in certain
circumstances, particularly when considering an individual without a
criminal record. Nowhere in the standards are prosecutors advised not to
charge the most severe charge possible. Nowhere do the standards give
substantial emphasis to the careful consideration a prosecutor should make
due to the impact of even a short prison stint on an individual’s life. While
scholars have emphasized the importance of prosecutors not charging the
harshest punishment possible for a particular crime,223 national prosecutor
standards have not determined the bar for severity in punishment.
The Supreme Court’s limits on sentence severity originate from the
218. NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-2.3 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009).
219. At most, these standards encourage the prosecutor to consider available civil remedies or
whether the punishment is “disproportionate.” Id. § 4-1.3(d); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
220. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017). For a discussion of appropriate severity, see generally Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive
Prosecution: A Review of Charged by Emily Bazelon, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 218 (2020) (book review)
(laying out policy-based prosecutor lenience).
221. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 26, at 606 (“[T]here is no established vocabulary
for judging prosecutors’ exercise of discretion . . . .”); Thomas, supra note 26, at 1057–58 (comparing
the more strict and hierarchical prosecutorial system of Germany to that of the United States); Gershman,
supra note 26, at 152 (noting other scholarship often cited for “the need for drafters of codes of
professional responsibility to write meaningful rules”); Green, Seek Justice, supra note 26, at 619 (noting
what qualifies as an “abuse of discretion” has not been “squarely answered”); Medwed, supra note 26, at
42 (relying on “justice” as prosecutor’s main guiding principle is “problematic because of the term’s
inherent vagueness”); Bresler, supra note 26, at 1301 (arguing that ABA language used in establishing
ethical standards “degenerates into malarkey upon closer examination”); Green & Levine, supra note 26,
at 151 (describing the ABA ethics rules as “non-enforceable guidelines”).
222. See NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-1.3 (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009) (referencing
factors prosecutors consider when make charging decisions but not encouraging prosecutors to limit
charges to just one crime).
223. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 26, at 599 (arguing the theory that people should
not be punished as harshly as the law permits is essential to the U.S. system); Mary D. Fan, Beyond
Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 597–605 (2012)
(advocating for proportionality review with respect to penal severity).
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dictates of the Magna Carta and Eighth Amendment.224 According to the
Supreme Court, the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are
“grossly disproportionate.”225 To determine disproportionality, the Court
measures “the relationship between the nature and number of offenses
committed and the severity of the punishment inflicted upon the offender,”226
although the Supreme Court has made clear that the Eight Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause applies only a “narrow
proportionality principle” when it comes to noncapital sentences.227
The Supreme Court has rarely struck down a sentence for severity.228
For instance, in Rummel v. Estelle, the Court held that prosecutors did not
violate the Eighth Amendment for charging and sentencing a three-time
criminal offender to life in prison without parole.229 The Supreme Court has
also upheld a defendant’s sentence to forty years in prison for possession
with intent to distribute nine ounces of marijuana.230 Though members of the
Court have mentioned, in a dissenting opinion, that even if punishment does
not serve a utilitarian function, it is important to consider whether the person
“deserves such punishment.”231 The example the dissenters gave of grossly
disproportionate punishment is a “mandatory life sentence for overtime
parking.”232 A life sentence for a parking violation seems to demonstrate the
limit of a prosecutor’s charging power—showing that it is nearly unlimited
as far as severity.
The Supreme Court has made clear that harsh charges are not a problem
and that only illegal or inappropriate charges are prohibited. For instance,
the Supreme Court has clarified that prosecutors “may exercise their
discretion” to charge a felony or misdemeanor, when either charge is
permissible.233 Indeed, it has gone further to state that the Court is a not a
224. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288–89 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The principle
of disproportionality is rooted deeply in English constitutional law. The Magna Carta of 1215 insured
that ‘[a] free man shall not be [fined] for a trivial offence except in accordance with the degree of the
offence; and for a serious offence shall be [fined] according to its gravity.’ ”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
225. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 271.
226. Id. at 288.
227. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996–1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
228. Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2156 (2018) (affirming the ordeal of the criminal trial);
McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2155 n.2 (2019); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS §§ 119, 870 (5th ed. 1984) (“[O]ne who is wrongfully
prosecuted may suffer both in reputation and by confinement.”).
229. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284–85.
230. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
231. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
232. Id.
233. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28–31 (2003) (holding California prosecutors can charge
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“superlegislature” with a duty to “second-guess [legislative] policy
choices.”234 Berger v. United States also states that a prosecutor may
“prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while
he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”235 The
Court arguably envisions a prosecutor being tough. Maybe charging several
crimes when one charge is possible constitutes a “hard blow,” which is
permissible. Overall, the Supreme Court has historically approved of severe
sentences as long as they are not grossly disproportionate, which seems to
be a very low bar.236
However, in a 2015 case, the Supreme Court hinted that the status quo
of charging the most severe sentence possible may not be acceptable
anymore.237 While the language relied on here is certainly dicta and some
may not interpret it as pushing back on prosecutors’ charging power, we
argue that these cases suggest that the Court is open to challenging the
validity of charging the most severe sentence possible. In Yates v. United
States, during oral arguments, the government attorney argued that his
understanding of the guidance provided by the U.S. Attorney’s Manual is
that “the prosecutor should charge . . . the offense that’s the most severe
under the law. That’s not a hard and fast rule, but that’s kind of the default
principle.”238 Justice Scalia responded, “Well, if that’s going to be the Justice
Department’s position, then we’re going to have to be much more careful
about how extensive statutes are. I mean, if you’re saying we’re always going
to prosecute the most severe, I’m going to be very careful about how severe
I make statutes.”239 The government then backtracked and argued that the
government is “not always going to prosecute every case, and obviously
“wobbler[s]” as either a felony or misdemeanor based on defendant’s record).
234. Ewing, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003).
235. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
236. In Bond v. United States, in a rare move, the Court second-guessed federal prosecutors in using
their discretion. The Supreme Court questioned a specific prison sentence against Bond for a chemical
weapons offense, which demonstrated a displacement of “public policy of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, enacted in its capacity as sovereign.” 572 U.S. 844, 865 (2014). Since this is a case about
a federal prosecutor and invokes federalism concerns, it could be an exception, and the Court may have
been more concerned about the federalism perspective than the prosecutor’s decision to bring federal
charges. However, this case may also signify a move towards greater judicial oversight of prosecutors in
general.
237. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 547–49 (2015).
238. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) (No. 13-7451).
During oral arguments in Bond v. United States, Justice Alito said, “If you told ordinary people that you
were going to prosecute Ms. Bond for using a chemical weapon, they would be flabbergasted. It’s—it—
it’s so far outside of the ordinary meaning of the word.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Bond, 572
U.S. 844 (No. 12-158). Justice Kennedy also questioned the prosecutor bringing this charge: “It also
seems unimaginable that you would bring this prosecution. But let’s leave that.” Id.
239. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Yates, 574 U.S. 528 (No. 13-7451); see also Transcript of
Oral Argument at 36, Bond, 572 U.S. 844 (No. 12-158).
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we’re going to exercise our discretion.”240 Earlier, Justice Scalia had
lamented the extreme charge: “What kind of a mad prosecutor would try to
send this guy up for 20 years or risk sending him up for 20 years?”241 The
Supreme Court ultimately reversed the sentence, interpreting the criminal
statute differently than the government.242
This exchange in Yates illustrates a few important points. The
government seems to acknowledge that the rule of federal prosecutors is to
charge the most severe crime possible, and this is supported clearly by the
U.S. Attorney’s Manual.243 But the Supreme Court seems to indicate that at
least in that instance, it was not supportive of this general rule. Although this
is the Court opining on a federal statute charged by federal prosecutors, this
could signal a trend among courts that charging the most severe statute will
not be acceptable—even for state prosecutors.244
If one were to apply Supreme Court and national guidelines, the
prosecutors who participated in our study would likely be deemed to have
used their discretion appropriately and even arguably within best practices
of prosecutors. Although, there was great heterogeneity that makes it
difficult to generalize. As a reminder, 30% of the study prosecutors
recommended jail time for an individual with no criminal record and who
seemed to need short-term therapy or a cooling-down period. The average
prosecutor recommending confinement charged three crimes and sought
thirty days in jail, which would likely result in this individual losing his job,
housing, and family life. The severity in fines we witnessed from prosecutors
also did not contradict national guidelines. Recall that $500 was the most
common fine imposed for this situation, in which no victim was physically
injured and no property was damaged. Broad surveys of the U.S. population
show that six out of ten Americans do not have $500 in savings, which
suggests that this fine amount may be onerous.245 It would certainly be an
amount an average fast-food worker would be unable to pay, which could
lead to other serious criminal justice implications for an arguably minor
offense.246
It is compelling that a national sample of prosecutors almost universally
240. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Yates, 574 U.S. 528 (No. 13-7451).
241. Id. at 28.
242. Yates, 574 U.S. at 547–48.
243. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-27.300 (2018) (“Once the decision to prosecute
has been made, the attorney for the government should charge and pursue the most serious, readily
provable offenses.”).
244. Reviewing state court limits on prosecution would be helpful to determine what differences
exist in state severity limits.
245. See supra note 178.
246. In one of our conditions, the defendant was a fast-food worker. See supra Part II.

2021]

PROSECUTORS AND MASS INCARCERATION

1175

charged, and in some instances recommended a significant jail term for an
individual who certainly made a serious mistake but did not cause any
physical harm or property damage and did not have the risk factors of future
violence.247 Aside from the effects on defendants and their families, such
incarceration also imposes onerous financial costs on the government,
amounting to over $65,000 per year in some jurisdictions.248 Indeed, 8% of
the prosecutors in our study wrote qualitative comments justifying their
punishment recommendations along the lines of a “few days in jail would do
good” for the accused. This contradicts evidence showing the opposite effect
of even short stints in jail.249 The costs borne by the prosecutor for these
sentences is nothing, and in fact, some scholars would argue that prosecutors
are “rewarded” for creating more prisoners and are harmed in their career by
being too lenient.250 But the cost to the defendant may be devastating.251
Even though our prosecutors recognized that the crime was minor, they
did not consider the devastating effect of criminal charges. One fifty-fiveyear-old respondent’s entire reasoning for their recommended sentence and
fine summarizes it best: “no big deal.”252 Yes, the crime may be truly “no
big deal,” but the consequences the defendant is left with are life-altering.
Any criminal charges and a few days in jail can even have devastating effects
on an individual’s life. Overall, prosecutors in our study did not indicate
through their written comments that they were sensitive to the potential
severity of their decisions and recommendations, and they had little reason
to be, given the national guidance they operate under. Unlike federal
prosecutors, who are encouraged to charge the most severe charges possible,
state prosecutors are not necessarily acting under similar guidance, but their
actions seem to indicate that this is their unwritten rule.
Overall, in examining Supreme Court precedent and major prosecutor
guidelines, our study demonstrated that prosecutors are completely within
their purview in charging and even arguably applying best practices. In other
words, there are not even loose recommendations against such severity in
247. Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 530 (2012)
(demonstrating empirically that individuals who have three or more convictions for violent crimes are at
a high risk for future violent crimes).
248. CHRIS MAI & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE PRICE OF PRISONS: EXAMINING
STATE SPENDING TRENDS, 2010–2015, at 8 (2017) (reporting that the cost of confinement per inmate
ranges from $14,780 in Alabama to $69,355 in New York with the average cost per state at $33,274).
249. See Shima Baradaran Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L. REV. 947, 954 (2020)
(“Any jail time even for a less serious crime leads to loss of a job, increased recidivism risk, and other
devastating effects on defendants’ lives.”).
250. BARKOW, supra note 10, at 8–9; see also infra note 282 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 177–79.
252. This prosecutor was born in 1965 and works in Region 6 (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi or
Tennessee).
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sentencing. The fact that there are no standards prohibiting the type of
prosecutor charging revealed in our study may demonstrate the real problem.
And given the lack of data or transparency in charging, prosecutors are likely
unaware that their individual decisions are collectively contributing to
increasing mass incarceration. Indeed, ABA, NDAA, and Supreme Court
precedent say nothing about exercising restraint in prosecutorial charging,
though they do emphasize even-handedly applying punishments. Though the
Supreme Court has cast a doubt on the unlimited nature of prosecutorial
discretion in the last ten years,253 there has been no guidance that would
prohibit prosecutors from charging more crimes than they need to. And only
the application of criminal sentences brought by federal statutes have been
questioned for severity, not state statutes, which are likely to receive more
deference.254 Federal guidelines actually encourage charging the most
serious crime possible. In order to reduce mass incarceration, it is necessary
to reexamine guidance for prosecutors to determine if the current level of
severity is appropriate.
C. UNIFORMITY IN CHARGING
The Supreme Court and national prosecutor guidelines make it clear
that uniformity is an important principle. Indeed, similarly situated
defendants should be treated the same. Our study, however, demonstrated
remarkable variability in sentencing.
The Supreme Court has expressed the importance of uniformity of
treatment of defendants but made clear that prosecutors are not necessarily
abusing their discretion when defendants receive disparate charges. The
Supreme Court has reiterated that the Constitution “requires that all persons
subjected to . . . legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities
imposed.”255 Indeed, in recent years, the Supreme Court has shown a slightly
less deferential view towards prosecutorial discretion. It has specifically
253. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402 (2010) (disagreeing with a prosecutor’s
interpretation stating “ ‘[r]ather than constru[ing] the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries
ambiguous . . . ,’ we read the statute ‘as limited in scope . . . .’ ” (quoting McNally v. United States, 483
U.S. 350, 360 (1987))); Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 896 (2014) (“[I]n its zeal to prosecute . . . ,
the Federal Government has ‘displaced’ the ‘public policy of . . . Pennsylvania . . . ’ that Bond does not
belong in prison . . . .” (quoting Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 224 (2011))); Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (“Application of the rule of lenity . . . strikes the appropriate balance
between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal liability.”); McDonnell v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016) (“The Court in Sun-Diamond declined to rely on ‘the
Government’s discretion’ to protect against overzealous prosecutions . . . .”).
254. Due to federalism dictates, it is likely that state prosecutors applying state criminal codes will
receive more deference in the criminal context than federal prosecutors applying federal laws.
255. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1887).
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expressed concerns about uniformity of prosecutor power. The Court in
McDonnell v. United States and Marinello v. United States made clear that
statutes that provide prosecutors too much power through “abstract, general”
language are not permitted.256 This risks a prosecutor “ ‘pursu[ing] their
personal predilections,’ which could result in the nonuniform execution of
that power across time and geographic location.”257 The Supreme Court—at
least generally—is in support of uniform execution of prosecutorial power,
though mere claims of disparate treatment are generally not actionable, even
where the disparate treatment tracks a protected class such as race.258
Both the ABA and NDAA prosecution standards make clear that
uniformity is important in prosecutorial charging.259 NDAA standards
specifically warn against an accused “receiving substantially different
treatment because the case was assigned to one individual in the office and
not to another.”260 Among NDAA factors prosecutors are to consider in
screening potential charges are the “charging decisions made for similarlysituated defendants.”261 One of the ABA standards considering charging
specifically recommends avoiding “unwarranted disparate treatment of
similarly situated persons.”262 While ABA standards mention a “reasonable”
amount of training for prosecutors with periodic review of office policies,
there is no mention of training or review to ensure uniformity of charging.263
256. Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1108–09 (2018) (“[R]ely[ing] upon prosecutorial
discretion to narrow the otherwise wide-ranging scope of a criminal statute’s highly abstract general
statutory language places great power in the hands of the prosecutor.”); McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372–
73 (“[We] cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the Government will ‘use it
responsibly.’ ”(quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010))).
257. Marinello, 584 U.S. at 1109–10 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)) (recognizing the public fear of “arbitrary prosecution,” which “risks
undermining necessary confidence in the criminal justice system”).
258. See ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 37.
259. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4(a)(ix) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2017); NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-5 cmt. (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009).
Standard 4-1.2 of the NDAA prosecution standards encourages the chief prosecutor to recognize the
importance of the initial charging decision and provide “appropriate training and guidance to prosecutors
regarding the exercise of their discretion.” Id. § 4-1.2.
260. See NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-5 cmt (NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N 2009).
261. See id. § 4-1.3(i).
262. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4(a)(ix) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2017).
263. See id. § 3-1.13(a)(d). The ABA standards provide the scope of recommended prosecutor
training:
In addition to knowledge of substantive legal doctrine and courtroom procedures, a prosecutor’s
core training curriculum should address the overall mission of the criminal justice system. A
core training curriculum should also seek to address: investigation, negotiation, and litigation
skills; compliance with applicable discovery procedures; knowledge of the development, use,
and testing of forensic evidence; available conviction and sentencing alternatives, reentry,
effective conditions of probation, and collateral consequences; civility, and a commitment to
professionalism; relevant office, court, and defense policies and procedures and their proper
application; exercises in the use of prosecutorial discretion; civility and professionalism;
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While the Supreme Court and prosecutor standards make clear that charging
and sentencing of defendants should be uniform, we recognize that some
scholars do not necessarily believe that uniformity of punishment is an
important or achievable goal.264
When we compare these standards to our study findings, however, we
find hardly any uniformity of charging. Prosecutors charged the same
defendant to varying terms ranging from five years of prison time to thirty
days of jail time or community service. Similarly, some prosecutors charged
the defendant hefty fines of up to $5,000, while others charged as little as
$250. The range was very large across our national sample, even within
geographic regions, and seemed very random.265 These findings demonstrate
that prosecutorial discretion is indeed broad, largely unsupervised, highly
variable, and inconsistent. Most of this variation was inexplicable. This study
demonstrates that for the same crime, individuals could receive disparate
sentences depending on the prosecutor they interact with. Furthermore, there
is no change in sight, as national guidelines and Supreme Court standards
prefer uniformity but do not give any details on what this looks like or create
actionable mechanisms to challenge disuniformity, and prosecutors do not
seem concerned with national guidelines.266 This seems to be left to
individual states and offices. There is also no leading guidance on the
importance of maintaining uniformity of punishment for similar defendants.
Thus, the final limit on a prosecutor’s discretion is misconduct.267
Prosecution is a local function and lacks the centralization or uniformity that
appreciation of diversity and elimination of improper bias; and available technology and the
ability to use it.
Id. § 3-1.13(b).
264. See generally Michael Davis, Sentencing: Must Justice Be Even-Handed?, 1 L. & PHIL. 77
(1982); Kay L. Levine, Should Consistency Be Part of the Reform Prosecutor’s Playbook?, 1 HASTINGS
J. CRIME & PUNISHMENT 169 (2020) (arguing that prosecutorial consistency of process is more important
than consistency of outcomes for defendants). James Q. Whitman believes that other Western countries
that are concerned with pre-conviction equality, while the United States is only concerned with postconviction equality. James Q. Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads,
1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 119, 121 (2009). “Continental law worries most that accused and suspected persons
may suffer disparate treatment, while American law worries that convicted persons may suffer disparate
treatment. This is a striking contrast indeed, which deserves more attention . . . ,” Whitman notes. Id.
“Contemporary American law has generally chosen to pursue equality by limiting discretion during the
latter phases of the criminal justice process,” he continues, arguing this is especially true at the sentencing,
infliction of punishment, and termination of punishment stages of the criminal justice process. Id. at 127.
265. We did however observe some correlations that merit further study. White and Hispanic
prosecutors recommended higher amounts of confinement than Black prosecutors. It is also interesting
that Mountain division prosecutors were harsher when it came to monetary penalties compared to New
England, Middle Atlantic, and West North Central prosecutors. Further exploration into the causes of
variability are required.
266. Uniformity can certainly also come from internal guidelines. This aspect of the study will be
discussed in a future paper.
267. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 26, at 596.
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other state or federal actors may have.268 In sum, even though uniformity is
an important objective for prosecutors, our study demonstrates that it is not
often achieved.269 While uniformity is certainly valued, there is currently no
way to implement it nationally.
D. MITIGATING A PROSECUTOR’S ROLE IN MASS INCARCERATION
In considering how to mitigate prosecutorial impacts on mass
incarceration, it is enlightening to consider what prosecutors believe guide
their decisions. When asked how they approach cases, some prosecutors in
our study wrote a version of the national prosecutor guidelines: “do justice,”
for example. One prosecutor wrote, “Just do the right thing. Everything else
will take care of itself.” And one particularly honest response was, “Use
discretion, don’t embarrass the office.” While prosecutors seem to say the
right thing as far as their overall goal, the vague national (and likely local)
guidance they receive may encourage them to believe that they are acting
appropriately. In fact, under national guidelines, there is no indication that
our study prosecutors were not completely within their discretion in charging
three crimes in a minor case and imposing thirty days of incarceration. There
is no indication that granting a five-year sentence for an assault violates any
Supreme Court principles of proportionality or uniformity. And if
embarrassing the office is a concern underlying prosecutor decisions, it will
likely be more embarrassing to charge less and appear soft on crime. What
is more, given that avoiding severity and ensuring uniformity is not
circumscribed by any national standard, it may be expected that some
prosecutors would let a defendant off with community service while some
would charge a year of confinement. Because discretion is still valuable—
due to the alternative being a rigid charging scheme—we consider how to
maintain prosecutor discretion while pushing prosecutors to consider their
impact on mass incarceration.
While current national guidelines for prosecutors seem appropriate,
examining them in light of prosecutor charging may demonstrate that
something is missing. We learned in Section I.B that prosecutors have not
reduced charging commensurate to police arrest rates in the last ten years
and that this may be impacting mass incarceration. Our study also
demonstrates that prosecutors would like to charge more than we might have
268. See id. at 619–20.
269. While this is by no means conclusive, in our study, prosecutors generally did not refer to
prosecutor standards when determining whether to charge. Indeed only 0.9% (5) of respondents
mentioned NDAA standards by name, and only one prosecutor mentioned ABA standards. Only 2.5%
(14) of prosecutors listed standards as important without providing a name for the national standards that
applied.
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expected, decline to prosecute many fewer cases at the outset, and are not
uniform in their decisions. Examining national prosecutor guidelines and
Supreme Court guidance also demonstrates that prosecutors are acting
appropriately in charging three crimes for a simple assault and imposing a
year or more of incarceration, as prosecutors are advised to be zealous
advocates and severity is not limited. All of this might support an argument
that we should impose strict charging guidelines for prosecutors. On the
other side, some prosecutors using their discretion will always interpret
guidelines differently than others. Is removing discretion the answer? For the
reasons articulated below, we do not advocate removing prosecutor charging
discretion despite the negative impacts individual charging decisions may
have. We do believe, however, that at a minimum, national and local
guidelines should explicitly advise prosecutors not to presumptively charge
the most serious crime possible and to consider the effects of their charging
decisions on mass incarceration. The Supreme Court has moved in this
direction, and more explicit guidance to this effect is welcome.
Indeed, the first reform we suggest is making national guidance explicit
that prosecutors should limit their impact on mass incarceration. In order for
prosecutor offices to effectively track their impact, data collection by office
and region is critical. While prosecutors seek justice, they have had no
meaningful guidance to consider the broader implications of their actions on
incarceration. Before our study, it was unclear whether prosecutor charging
rates were out of step with the national reduction in crime and arrests. We
now see that prosecutors may have room to reduce criminal charging, given
the reduction of crime and arrests. Arming prosecutors with this kind of
information may influence individual and office level prosecutor decisions.
Requiring prosecutor offices to consider the costs of incarceration to their
jurisdiction and to the accused would also be helpful.270 Data on charging
and costs of charging decisions should be available to prosecutor offices so
that they may consider the broader impacts their decisions have on mass
incarceration.
The typical response to prosecutorial problems—reduced discretion—
may not provide the hoped for reductions in mass incarceration.271 As it
270. Baughman, supra note 49, at 1125 (“If success [for prosecutors] includes cutting costs, . . .
prosecutors may be praised for seeking more community service sentences, more restitution and fines,
and less incarceration for less serious crimes.”).
271. See Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1087, 1104 (2005) (“Perhaps the only way to remove some of the severity [of the existing
system] is to allow prosecutors to operate quietly, dispensing mercy in a few cases, even if it is done
inconsistently.”); PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12, at 149–50 (explaining that New Jersey plea
bargaining guidelines increases sentencing disparity and harshness); Bellin, supra note 58, at 837 (noting
as Bellin astutely points out, “[t]he prosecutorial charging guidelines and enhanced transparency Locked
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currently stands, most states are much less punitive with crimes than the
federal government.272 The federal sentencing guidelines removed much
discretion from prosecutors with the intended goal of creating an “effective,
fair sentencing system.”273 Indeed the guidelines aimed to “achieve
reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the range of sentences that
could be imposed for similar offenses committed by similar offenders” and
to “seek proportionality in sentencing by imposing different sentences.”274
Unfortunately, the goals of uniformity and proportionality were not met by
federal sentencing guidelines without a commensurate (and unintended)
increase in incarceration. Some have argued that the criminal justice system
is a “hydraulic system . . . like a water balloon: If you squeeze it at one
decision point in the effort to control discretion, it will bulge at another.”275
In other words, if we demand charging equality, will it be more difficult to
obtain sentence equality? This is the worry. Moving towards state charging
guidelines similar to the federal sentencing guidelines may actually worsen
mass incarceration in the way the federal guidelines have.276
Rather than strict guidelines, providing simple principles could help
prosecutor charging. Some principles to consider are: (1) do not charge more
than one crime when one will do; (2) do not automatically charge the most
severe charge; and (3) consider avoiding the creation of a new criminal
record. Additionally, before charging, always consider if an alternative exists
In champions will not reduce incarceration”).
272. Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: Shooting Down
the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1643 (2002) (noting the
disparity between state and federal law for punishment of gun crimes); Christine DeMaso, Note, Advisory
Sentencing and the Federalization of Crime: Should Federal Sentencing Judges Consider the Disparity
Between State and Federal Sentences Under Booker?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2096 (2006) (affirming
that “federal penalties are generally higher than state penalties”). Though note that state sentences have
increased significantly for major crimes. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
273. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1.A.3 (2018). Sentencing guidelines
apply to judges, but it is important to note that prosecutors still hold a large amount of discretion as to the
initial charging decision, which could trigger mandatory sentencing ranges.
274. Paul M. Secunda, Note, Cleaning Up the Chicken Coop of Sentencing Uniformity: Guiding the
Discretion of Federal Prosecutors Through the Use of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 34 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1267, 1272 (1997).
275. Whitman, supra note 265, at 123; see also Daniel P. Kessler & Anne M. Piehl, The Role of
Discretion in the Criminal Justice System, 14 J.L. ECON & ORG. 256 (1998); Michael Tonry & John C.
Coffee, Jr., Enforcing Sentencing Guidelines: Plea Bargaining and Review Mechanisms, in THE
SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES (Hirsch et al. eds., 1987); William J. Stuntz, The
Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 790–91 (2006).
276. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1263 (D. Utah 2004), aff’d, 433 F.3d 738
(10th Cir. 2006), (concluding that the “55-year sentence mandated by [the federal sentencing
requirements] in this case appears to be unjust, cruel, and irrational”); Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1319 (2005)
(concluding that “the federal sentencing guidelines system has failed” because it produces bad outcomes
too often); MAUER & KING, supra note 5, at 7–8 (arguing federal sentencing guidelines result in more
people incarcerated for longer periods of time).
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to charging a crime, such as referral to mental health services, drug addiction
support, mediation, or other social services, options which some respondents
in our study wrote that they would pursue. This focus would require a system
in which a prosecutor’s job advancement does not rely on their increasing
punishment but on creatively solving community problems, sometimes
without a day in jail. There are certainly other principles that might be
considered for improved prosecutor charging277 and other solutions that may
involve removing or drastically altering the role of prosecutors and police in
criminal justice.278
Instead of removing discretion through national charging guidelines, an
independent local and state review of prosecutorial charging practices and
data on local practices might improve uniformity and reduce severity in
charging. Indeed, one of us has argued elsewhere that prosecutors need a
constitutional check, like a regular independent internal review.279 This
could come through an internal review board under the purview of the
governor and attorney general or an independent, disinterested body that
reviews prosecutor charging decisions and plea-bargaining agreements.280 A
quarterly or biannual review could help with uniformity and severity
between prosecutors in an office or within a particular region. Similar cases
could be compared to consider charging uniformity and overall severity and
incarceration rates in a region, and these decisions could be analyzed in the
context of jail space and community goals.281 This would also involve
educating communities where prosecutors are elected on these issues282 and
277. See supra note 26–27.
278. See Shima Baradaran Baughman, Why Do We Fund Police?, MEDIUM (June 10, 2020),
https://medium.com/@shimabaughman/why-do-we-fund-police-1aacaa1739b8 [https://perma.cc/PDL633K7].
279. Baughman, supra note 49, at 1123 (arguing for “quarterly internal review procedures to
determine whether individual prosecutors are meeting office goals”).
280. Id. at 1138–39. Jennifer Lee noted the potential benefits of mandating prosecutorial data
collection:
Mandating the collection of various procedural data on matters such as arrests, prison time, and
plea bargains creates a valuable metric by which to assess ethics and help voters make informed
decisions during prosecutorial elections. Tracking behavior and placing prosecutors under the
care of the Attorney General also instills a heightened sense of professional accountability. By
placing the responsibility of creating internal discovery policies upon the attorney general,
states gain the ability to conduct a centralized system of control and maintain uniformity and
fairness in criminal matters. Independent prosecutorial review panels expedite the complaint
process because panel members are able to focus exclusively on prosecutors, unlike state bar
associations tasked with investigating and disciplining every licensed attorney in the state.
Lee, supra note 60, at 1.
281. Bellin, supra note 58.
282. Broad public transparency on prosecutorial charging factors might not improve incarceration.
Some scholars argue that prosecutors should inform the public of what factors they consider when making
charging decisions. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 26, at 622; Sawyer, supra note 17, at 621
(noting prosecutors feel compelled to hide their motivations for prosecuting from the public, which
“reduces the availability of information that voters need to make informed choices, limits the control the
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changing the current incentives prosecutors have to overcharge because their
success is too often based on increasing punishment whenever possible.283
Larger structural changes could also be considered to improve prosecutorial
charging.284 Such independent review maintains prosecutor discretion while
potentially leading to broader discussions among prosecutors on the right
way to balance competing interests of justice to victims and society and
impacts on mass incarceration.
Improving our understanding of how prosecutors are charging
nationally is critical to stopping the growth of mass incarceration.
Prosecutors need to be made aware of their role in mass incarceration and
held responsible through independent review of their collective actions. It is
unclear from our data, but it could be that prosecutors are routinely charging
individuals with several crimes. It appears harsh to charge crimes in almost
every case, even minor ones. But a prosecutor may impose these charges,
knowing that they can be used for leverage in plea bargaining and that some
of them will be dropped.285 Individual prosecutors are rewarded for winning
cases, holding defendants accountable, and making the office “look good.”
However, what may go unnoticed is that often during plea negotiations—
where many if not all of these charges are dropped—an individual is in
pretrial detention,286 which is the greatest contributor to jail overcrowding
democratic process can exert over prosecutors . . . , and cuts short opportunities for fruitful debate over
the best approach to criminal justice”). We agree with Barkow that the more transparency there is on
charging decisions, the larger the potential threat that elected prosecutors place pressure on line
prosecutors to pursue more severe charges. BARKOW, supra note 10, at 8–9 (“Elected leaders fear being
labeled as soft on crime, so they aim to appear as tough as possible, even if there is no empirical grounding
for the approaches they endorse.”).
283. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 26, at 589; Leonetti, supra note 74, at 60–65, 74–
75 (proposing a “doctrinal mechanism for reigning in the incentives to overcharge within the existing
system of prosecutorial discretion”). On the other side, some scholars argue that prosecutors have no
desire to maximize punishment. Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 762, 762, 764–67 (2016) (arguing that “as political actors, prosecutors have no inherent desire to
seek maximal punishment” consistently and that “[p]rosecutors do not bring every case that they could
win; they do not invariably try to maximize severity of punishment . . . .”); Richard T. Boylan, What Do
Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attorneys, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 379, 379
(2005) (“[C]onviction rates do not appear to affect the careers of U.S. attorneys.”); Edward L. Glaeser,
Daniel P. Kessler & Anne Morrison Piehl, What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the
Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 261 (2000) (demonstrating the incentives
that create “a desire . . . to pursue the most dangerous criminals and a desire . . . to pursue criminals who
will bring them private career returns”); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away
Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 966–69 (1997) (arguing that prosecutors are
motivated by maximizing convictions, re-election, “not losing,” and reputation).
284. See Barkow, Institutional Design, supra note 69, and Baughman, supra note 49, at 1091, for
arguments that major structural changes must be made for prosecutorial motivations and decisions to
change.
285. A few of our prosecutors indicated they were using this exact strategy in their qualitative
responses.
286. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 25, at 77–92.
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and adds to the mass incarceration problem by sheer volume of minor
cases.287 The defendant spends time in jail, even if the case is later
dismissed.288 A prosecutor starting a case by bringing several charges for a
minor crime ends up costing both the state and the defendant for their harsh
charging choices when the defendant spends time in jail.289 Without data
collection at office, regional, and national levels, an individual prosecutor
has no idea what the overall effects of their charging decisions are.
Prosecutor offices face no consequences for the costs of incarceration they
impose and do not have to deal with the collateral consequences they impose
on defendants, like the loss of employment and housing that frequently
accompany a short stint in jail.290 Simple awareness by prosecutor offices of
these collective costs, accompanied by increased accountability through
independent review, could lead to new thinking on prosecutor charging
practices and eventually a shift in mass incarceration.
CONCLUSION
Prosecutors unknowingly contribute to mass incarceration through
individual charging decisions. Previous work argues that prosecutors
increased crimes charged from 1980 to 2007.291 However, during the last ten
to fifteen years, crime rates have dropped, and arrest rates have gone down.
But the findings in our study demonstrate that during this same time period,
prosecutors have actually increased the ratio of criminal court filings per
arrest. That is to say, police are helping decrease mass incarceration, but
prosecutors are not doing their part, possibly because they are not aware of
the problem. There is very little data or transparency for individual
prosecutors to know how other prosecutors are charging nationally.
The study relied upon here demonstrates why this trend of excessive
charging may be a national issue. In our study with a sample of prosecutors
from across the nation, depicting a minor, assault-based crime with no
physical injury, respondents consistently charged crimes in almost every
instance. Our study demonstrates the lowest rate of declinations ever found
in a national study, with only 3% of prosecutors refusing to charge a crime.
We also observed surprising severity and wild variability in charging.
Indeed, prosecutors most commonly charged three crimes, and some charged
287. See Baughman, supra note 23.
288. See generally SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL LOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK
AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2017).
289. See BAZELON, supra note 12; PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12.
290. See Baughman, supra note 49.
291. See BAZELON, supra note 12; PFAFF, LOCKED IN, supra note 12. But see Reilly, supra note 55
(providing an example of limits on prosecutor’s ability to file or dismiss charges).
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up to eleven. While less than 30% of prosecutors recommended jail time and
40% recommended a fine, those who did so recommended incarceration
ranging from five years to thirty days and fines from $5,000 to $500. Our
review of national guidelines from the Supreme Court and prosecutor
standards demonstrate that national guidelines do not stand in the way of any
of these decisions and may even encourage severe charging practices.
We do not prescribe a single solution for reducing severity or improving
uniformity of prosecutor charging. We do not recommend removing
discretion, but we do believe that collecting prosecutor charging data and
requiring a regular independent review of prosecutorial decisions could help
prosecutors consider the impact of their charging decisions. Our hope is that
informing prosecutors of the scale of the charging problem and its effects on
mass incarceration will lead to a more careful approach to prosecutorial
charging nationwide.
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APPENDIX
FIGURE 1. National Estimates of State Criminal Filings and Arrests, 2006–
2018
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Notes: The difference in arrests and filings could be due to a number of factors, including that the
additional filings are for parole or probation revocation cases, meaning there was no new arrest, but there
was a new filing. Parole violation filings have decreased in the last ten years, though not as much as arrest
or overall filings, which include new cases, reopened cases—which count parole violations—and
reactivated cases. It is unclear how much of a factor parole violations play in the decrease in criminal
filings.
§
2006: STATE COURTS 2007, supra note 100; SNYDER, supra note 107.
§
2007: ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER, SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND,
CHANTAL G. BROMAGE, SARAH A. GIBSON, ASHLEY N. MASON & WILLIAM E. RAFTERY,
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF
2007 STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS 2 (2009); SNYDER, supra note 107.
§
2008: ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, RICHARD SCHAUFFLER, SHAUNA STRICKLAND, CHANTAL
BROMAGE, SARAH GIBSON & ASHLEY MASON, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS 20
(2010); SNYDER, supra note 107.
§
2009: ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, RICHARD SCHAUFFLER, SHAUNA STRICKLAND, SARAH
GIBSON & ASHLEY MASON, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2009 STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS 3 (2011); SNYDER,
supra note 107.
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2010: ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, RICHARD SCHAUFFLER, SHAUNA STRICKLAND & KATHRYN
HOLT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS
OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS 3 (2012); SNYDER, supra note 107.
§
2011: NCSC did not collect data.
§
2012: ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, RICHARD SCHAUFFLER, KATHRYN HOLT & KATHRYN
LEWIS, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF 2012 STATE TRIAL COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS 8 (2014); Crime in the United
States 2012: Estimated Number of Arrests (Table 29), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/29tabledatadecpdf
[https://perma.cc/VRC3-GSJG].
§
2013: ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, SHAUNA STRICKLAND, RICHARD SCHAUFFLER, KATHRYN
HOLT & KATHRYN LEWIS, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2013 STATE TRIAL COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS 7 (2015); Crime
in the United States 2013: Estimated Number of Arrests (Table 29), FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table
-29/table_29_estimated_number_of_arrests_united_states_2013.xls [https://perma.cc/3QFLWEFJ].
§
2014: CT. STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., 2014 DATA SUMMARY 3 (2016);
Crime in the United States 2014: Estimated Number of Arrests (Table 29), FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table
-29 [https://perma.cc/M55J-VCJP].
§
2015: RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER, SHAUNA STRICKLAND, KATHRYN HOLT & KATHRYN
GENTHON, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN
OVERVIEW OF 2015 STATE COURT CASELOADS 3 (2016); Crime in the United States 2015:
Estimated Number of Arrests (Table 29), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.
gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-29
[https://perma.cc/B8HSHXS6].
§
2016: CT. STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., STATE COURT CASELOAD
DIGEST: 2016 DATA 2 (2018); Crime in the United States 2016: Estimated Number of Arrests
(Table 18), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crimein-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/tables/table-18 [https://perma.cc/N5DK-8TV9].
§
2017: CASELOAD DIGEST 2017, supra note 18; Crime in the United States 2017: Estimated
Number of Arrests (Table 29), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-inthe-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/tables/table-29 [https://perma.cc/U3JF-ZGD
G].
§
2018: CASELOAD DIGEST 2018, supra note 95, at 7; CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2018, supra
note 106.
Calculation for Change in Criminal Filings:
§
[(17,000,000 – 21,600,000) / 21,600,000) * 100] = -21.3%
Calculation for Change in Criminal Arrests:
§
[(10,310,960 – 14,382,852) / 14,382,852) * 100] = -28.31%
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FIGURE 2. Estimated Criminal Filings per Arrest, 2003–2018
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2003: STATE COURTS 2004, supra note 95, at 14; SNYDER, supra note 107.
2004: NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2005, at 15
(Richard Y. Schauffler et al. eds., 2006); SNYDER, supra note 107.
§
2005: NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2006, at 21
(Robert C. LaFountain et al. eds., 2007); SNYDER, supra note 107.
§
2006–2018: See supra Appendix, Figure 1 for sources.
Calculation of Filings or Arrest:
§
2003: 20,600,000 / 13,646,642 = 1.51 filings / arrest (same process for each year)
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PROSECUTORS AND MASS INCARCERATION

TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics
Recommended Disposition of Case

Percentage of Sample or Mean

Felony Charge

15.85%

Monetary Penalty

41.50%

Average Amount of Monetary Penalty

$242.75

Confinement

27.05%

Average Minimum Days of Confinement

21.40 days

Jurisdiction Characteristics
Average Size of Office

31.60 prosecutors

Size of Jurisdiction
Over 2,000,000 people

7.54%

1,000,000–2,000,000 people

10.56%

500,000–1,000,000 people

10.13%

100,000–500,000 people

28.23%

Less than 100,000 people

43.53%

Region
New England

4.30%

Middle Atlantic

3.44%

Midwest

21.08%

West North Central

11.18%

South Atlantic

15.70%

East South Central

8.60%

West South Central

1.08%

Mountain

22.80%

Pacific

11.83%

Prosecutor Characteristics
Average Number of Years as Prosecutor
Head Prosecutor
Average Age

12.70 years
22.96%
46.18 years

Gender
Male

65.52%

Female

34.48%
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Race
White

90.41%

Black/African American

4.14%

American Indian/Alaska Native

0.65%

Asian

0.65%

Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander

0.22%

Other

3.92%

Hispanic
No

96.09%

Mexican/Mexican American/Chicano

1.30%

Puerto Rican

0.22%

Cuban

1.09%

Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino

1.30%

Notes: Robertson et al., supra note 35, at 808 tbl.1.
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